UNDER THE UMBRELLA

A Phenomenological
Study of Joyce's
Ulysses

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I
Opusculum paedagogum.
The pears are not viols,
Nudes or bottles.
They resemble nothing else.

II
They are yellow forms
Composed of curves
Bulging toward the base.
They are touched red.

III
They are not flat surfaces
Having curved outlines.
They are round
Tapering toward the top.

IV
In the way they are modelled
There are bits of blue.
A hard dry leaf hangs
From the stem.

V
The yellow glistens.
It glistens with various yellows,
Citrons, oranges and greens
Flowering over the skin.

VI
The shadows of the pears
Are blobs on the green cloth.
The pears are not seen
As the observer wills.

--Wallace Stevens

1. Opusculum Paedagogum

This study began several years ago, when the authors combined their interests in Edmund Husserl's phenomenology and James Joyce's Ulysses. Husserl's meditations on the "structures" of consciousness and Joyce's dramatization of them seemed so similar as attempts at revealing conscious experience that both the philosopher and the novelist could almost be said to be doing the "same thing" in their respective disciplines. We could find no evidence that Husserl ever read Joyce; even if he did, he had already established at least the foundation of his new philosophy by 1913, when he published Ideen an einer reinen Phänomenologie, nine years before the publication of Ulysses. Joyce in turn apparently knew little of phenomenology (although the word "phenomenologist" appears once, humorously, in Ulysses) and probably would not have regarded his ignorance as a loss; his own philosophical background was largely Scholastic, Thomistic, from his Jesuit upbringing. But we observed in the doctrine of the philosopher and the method of the novelist affinities too striking to be purely fortuitous. Both seemed aspects of a newly prevailing view of the old "human nature" as "fields" formed by the engagement of consciousness with the world.

We wondered whether phenomenology could be used to analyze Ulysses and found that it could--that, indeed, Ulysses appeared as almost a paradigm of phenomenological conclusions. If it could serve Ulysses (and presumably "stream-of-consciousness" fiction in general), why not other forms of imaginative writing? Did phenomenology perhaps offer principles for a literary criticism? We came to think that it did and we realized that it was time something did. For criticism has flourished in our time, but in a desperate

and weedy state. It has lost its nerve. A century and a half ago, by decree of Coleridge, whose Biographia Literaria would become the greatest single influence on modern literary theory, criticism could continue to be resolutely normative: it could claim to provide rational criteria for sound literary performance and, therefore, evaluation. Biographia Literaria (1817) excoriated contemporary reviewers for admiring without judgment and censuring without reason; it called for "fixed canons of criticism, previously established and deduced from the nature of man."

The proper foundation of a critical system was Coleridge's theory of perception-imagination. With Angst, shrewdness and fanfare he worked up to his famous definition in Chapter XIII of primary imagination as "the living power and prime agent of all human perception." Every person is thus by nature a creative being, for he imagines what he perceives; that is, he puts it together meaningfully. Those with more of this ability, such as poets and painters, possess the "secondary" imagination, which "dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to recreate" or at least "to idealize and to unify." But how the theory applies to the actual evaluation of poems is disappointingly unclear. Nor is it still possible to assume that critical canons ought to be based on "human nature," that once-stable entity which has long been unfixed; or that what might be known about human existence can readily be applied to human art, even if "being" does imply "creating." Coleridge's own critical asseverations, on Shakespeare and Wordsworth, for example, are full of good sense but rest on rather ordinary moral and psychological norms. When more recent criticism has taken a normative position, like that of the neo-humanists some forty years ago, its foundation is usually a belief in an essential humanity,

which most contemporary literature and philosophy, as well as the sciences, have not upheld.

The antique claim for the epistemological value of art—revitalized for the Romantics by Kant's a priori manner of knowin is also questionable. Is literature really a way of knowing? And what is known by it? In contemplating a poem one learns something--that is, finds something out--but we doubt that the discovered object is "human nature," even in the relative sense of the species not having changed all that much in 50,000 years; nor does it seem to be "the world," "the poet's mind" or anything else whose presence is validated in other, perhaps more direct, more empirical or rational ways. The literary object, the work itself, still remains to be known, even if its existence cannot be validated beyond its occurrence in the reader's consciousness, and its relation to other forms of being ought to be for the critic no more than a second-order consideration. In Wellek and Warren's Theory of Literature (New York: Harcourt, 1949), Austin Warren states that literature ought to be valued for "what it is": "The nature, the function, and the evaluation of literature must necessarily exist in close correlation. The use of a thing--its habitual or most expert or proper use--must be that use to which its nature (or its structure) designs it. Its nature is, in potence, what, in act, is its function. It is what it can do; it can do and should do what it is. . . . It is not what elements but how they are put together, and with what function, which determine whether a given work is or is not literature" (228-229).

The "essence" of literature, then, is end, or function. Yet how it functions may be uncertain, except in the psychologistic sense of how the reader is "affected" by it, which Warren does not mean. What is required of the reader is that he postulate fairly early in his observation what the functioning

object is as it exists most purely to his consciousness. The practice of criticism needs to be certified by an ontology which we think phenomenology provides.

II

From a philosophical point of view critical theory remains trapped between an outworn dualism of psychologism and objectivism. Although Coleridge believed that the imagination unified mind and nature (a belief which protended the phenomenological concept of intentionality), he did not realize the implications for criticism, which was and still is largely a matter of a subject (the reader) trying in some way to know an object (the poem or even the poet).[1] Psychologism is obviously on the subjective side; it tends to regard literature as only a mental experience for the reader. Objectivism views it as something which can be known "out there," as it is in itself, even though revealed only through its effects. This dualism may be demonstrated briefly in selected writings of I. A. Richards, for psychologism, and John Crowe Ransom, for objectivism. Rambling daringly in between is Kenneth Burke. All three are now elder

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[1] We have treated Coleridge's theory of imagination so cursorily that we should like to mention several writers who examine it more thoroughly: William K. Wimsatt, Jr., and Cleanth Brooks, Literary Criticism: A Short History (New York: Random House), 1957; M. H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition (London: Oxford), 1953; René Wellek, A History of Modern Criticism: 1750-1950, Vol.2, The Romantic Age (New Haven: Yale), 1955. For an excellent bibliography, see Thomas M. Raysor, ed., The English Romantic Poets: A Review of Research (New York: MLA), 1956.

statesmen of literary theory in English. The work of each is distinguished by originality, acuteness and a philosophical bent. They are close explorers of texts. All have published poems (Burke, two novels as well), and Ransom, indeed, is a poet of distinction.

In Principles of Literary Criticism (New York: Harcourt, 1925) Richards took stock of the history of criticism and swept it bare of "a few conjectures, a supply of admonitions, many acute isolated observations, some brilliant guesses, much oratory and applied poetry, inexhaustible confusion, a sufficiency of dogma, no small stock of prejudices, whimsies and crotchets, a profusion of mysticism, a little genuine speculation, sundry stray inspirations, pregnant hints and random aperçus..."(6).

His attitudes toward critical practice are still sound: the critic should know what he is talking about, look at what he is reading and free his mind of cant; the peripheral study (homework) necessitated by such a poem as The Waste-land is not a critical analysis of it; the "truth" of a literary work has nothing to do with an extra-literary reality, or "reference"; evaluations ought not be vague or arbitrary; stock responses should be replaced by precise determinations. Richards was almost a "New Critic" in these respects. But his main principles are far less tenable: what matters in poetry ("evocative speech") is the arousal of the reader; knowledge (cognition) belongs to science and has nothing to do with emotions, which belong to poetry (Richards would change his mind about this); yet a poem is in effect if not in purpose a communication between poet and reader; the value of a poem is determined by the number of impulses it organizes, and therefore "the critical question in all cases is whether the poem is worth the trouble it entails" (291). The healthy influence

of Richards, especially on the teaching of poetry (after Practical Criticism, 1929), is incalculable; the unhealthy influence--not really his fault--probably appears in the attitude of many working critics, that it is enough for a critic to know his own response.

Today it scarcely seems possible that a serious literary thinker should not be indebted to Richards. But such terms as "emotional effect," "sensory stimuli," "mental event," "unified response in the right reader," "organized impulses," "coherent whole of feeling and attitude" no longer ring true, because they equate a poem with its effects upon a reader who can provide "an adequate reading" and suggest that a poem's "qualities" are only in the mind of such a reader. The poem of course may hold much more and might require far more than adequacy to be fully understood; surely its value should not be tailored to the ability of a merely adequate reader.

Although Richards believed that "the arts are our storehouse of recorded values," for in them "the varying possibilities of existence are most clearly seen" (32)--that they are healthful, in short--he offered no way of evaluating them beyond an unconvincing quantitative analysis: if the work of art amounts to "organized impulses," the superior work offers more impulses better organized. The conduct of life itself is "an attempt to organize impulses so that success is obtained for the greater number or mass of them"; "the underlying basis of morality [is] the effort to attain maximum satisfaction through coherent systematisation..." (46, 56). The breadth of the Principles never attains a sufficient depth because of the claim that the "world of poetry has in no sense any different reality from the rest of the world... [but] is made up of experiences of exactly the same kinds as those that come to us in other

ways," allowing for a more highly organized experience in poetry, as well as for a communicable one (78). Richards's "analysis of a poem" (Chapter XVI), which amounts to an elaborate "schema of the mental events" induced in reading it, turns out to be no such analysis at all and is impracticable. It refuses to consider the object (poem) itself, which, according to Richards, cannot really be known.

Richards was still the apostle of "effects" in Practical Criticism, even though in practice he was scrupulously objective, as his chief American criticizer, John Crowe Ransom, pointed out. Ransom established his case against the "subjectivist aesthetic" in two strong essays, "A Psychologist Looks at Poetry" and "I. A. Richards: The Psychological Critic."[2] Although Ransom is generally severe, his second, more thorough essay is milder ("I think he has done infinitely more good than harm," 4n), and he praises Richards for his "contribution to intensive reading." But he insists throughout The New Criticism that critical discussion should be concerned with the objective situations correlative to emotions, because there is no such thing as an emotion without something which induces it: "The specific quality of any emotion is all but indefinable in pure emotive terms, and that seems to be because the distinctness that we think of as attaching to an emotion belongs really to the object towards which we have it. ...I should think there is ...no emotion at all until an object has furnished the occasion for one" (20).

Ransom's special contribution to critical theory is corrective. He is relentless with inadequate thinking, such as T. S. Eliot's "theoretical innocence" (145). Yet though he has been a most philosophically-minded critic,

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[2]In, respectively, The World's Body (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State), 1938, 1968; and The New Criticism (Norfolk, Conn.: New Directions), 1941.

his own theorizing oddly lacks a systematic philosophical foundation. He seems to have been aware of this, for he complains in his preface that "this...new criticism [whose practitioners are William Empson, Eliot, Yvor Winters, R. P. Blackmur, Richards and himself] does not usually have enough background in philosophy, and may rely on perfectly inadequate formulas, under which precise thinking cannot be effected" (x-xi). He came close to becoming the "ontological critic" he was seeking over thirty years ago, but only close. His definitions were bold; for example, "Science gratifies a rational or practical impulse and exhibits the minimum of perception. Art gratifies a perceptual impulse and exhibits the minimum of reason" (The World's Body, p. 130). But for the most part his value as a critical thinker is that of counter-intelligence.

His art (icon)-science (symbol) dichotomy is rhetorically neat and, like his other discriminations--such as those between poetry and prose, meter and meaning--is useful in logical discourse. But he does not bridge his antitheses. The poetic object, which he insists on, is more persuasive than Richards's organized impulses because it is more apparent and localized; and, if accepted as a working hypothesis, it does allow for precise determinations. It has a commonsense charm which we shall refer to in the next chapter as "protestant." After all, there is difficulty not believing in a literary object out there, existing separately from a reader's consciousness. But one may seriously doubt that such an object is what the critic actually discusses and may further doubt that it is "the world" which is given in art. Ransom urges the ontology of the object without showing how it can really be known; he is insufficiently metaphysical.

The doubt invades his own text: "In what world of discourse does [the poetic phrase] have its existence? As a thing of sounds it exists in the words; as a thing of meanings it exists in a world beyond the words. ...it exists in both at once" (The

New Criticism, p. 328). His answer is brave, but the great gulf between subject and object is still fixed. We shall attempt to cross it by positing that what a critic really refers to is the object-as-perceived, which is possibly not given in words but through and between them.

The critical writings of Kenneth Burke suggest an extraordinarily fertile and busy mind, well stocked yet somewhat in disarray. A seminal thinker in the strict sense, he has scattered a lot of seed by the wayside, but also has obtained a high yield, sometimes in unexpected places. His agitated style, hybridized terminology and seeming inability to sustain a theme until it has been sufficiently elaborated tend to have a centrifugal effect on the reader's attention. But with patience one discovers insights almost casually dropped. We are concerned with two earlier works, Counter-Statement (London: Cambridge, 1931) and The Philosophy of Literary Form (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State, 1941).[3]

Burke began as a formalist critic and to a great extent remained one. This would place him on the "objective" side, yet not quite. One idea in Counter-Statement is that conventional literary forms are important only insofar as they fulfill an audience's expectations; in other words, form is meaningless unless it is effective. Burke's interest in both structural classification and psychological effect on a reader or viewer connects him back to the great classical theorists Aristotle and Longinus. He distinguishes between an "ideal" literature, which aims at a categorical concept of perfection, and a relativistic, or historical literature, which responds to the "needs" of an audience at a particular time (184 ff.). Although this distinction no doubt reflects the uneasiness of a young man of letters who wanted to justify his work in the grim face of the Great Depression (as he points out in the appendix, "Curriculum Criti-

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[3]The edition of Counter-Statement referred to here is that published by the University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1968; that of The Philosophy of Literary Form is the second edition, again published by Louisiana State University Press, 1967.

cum," 1953), he does not seem to have reconciled the two kinds. Had he done so, he would have overcome the objectivist-psychologistic dualism. He came close, however, in his observation that "a form is a way of experiencing" (143); but exactly what is experienced in literature or what a literary experience consists of remained unexplored.

In The Philosophy of Literary Form Burke attempted, though too briefly, to integrate form and content. The form, or structure, of a poem, such as "The Ancient Mariner," "functions" in a certain way. It "does something" to the reader, who "participates" in it, breathing into "this anatomic structure a new physiological vitality that resembles, though with a difference, the act of its maker, the resemblance being in the overlap between writer's and reader's situation, the difference being in the fact that these two situations are far from identical" (90). One might wish to alter the "writer's" situation to that of the characters. Otherwise Burke seems to have been steering correctly, we think, toward the point that the reader shares in the activity of the poem--that, to push the argument a little further, the reader to some extent constitutes the poem, makes it up, gives it "content." It exists, then, neither as an object "known" only approximately, through its formal appearance, nor as organized neural impulses, but rather as a phenomenon within the reader's consciousness. So far Burke was a proto-phenomenological critic (in "Curriculum Criticum" he cites his method as "somewhat phenomenological in aim, seeking to get at the psychological depth of a work through the sheer comparison of its surfaces"--217). But he never nurtured his brief insight into a full-blown theory.

He balanced object and subject, but both become dubious in his positing a collective experience: "if we try to discover what the poem is doing for the

poet, we may discover a set of generalizations as to what poems do for everybody" (73). We doubt that poems do anything for everybody; and we note that Burke's object, the "symbolic" or "poetic" act (that is, words in their significations as images, metaphors, symbols--words standing for an external reality), does not reside with the poem but with the poet. Thus, in "The Ancient Mariner," he espies five strands of symbolic act, called "problems" (personal problems for Coleridge, mathematical ones--"equations"--for the reader): the aesthetic, the marital, the political, the drug, the metaphysical. His assumption is that the more information a reader has on the poet and on the implications words held for him, the more one can experience the "poetic act." This may be true, but it confuses the experience of the poem with whatever the poet experienced, which, after all, is his own affair. Subject and object are now unified in a weird, surrealistic way: the object, which is the poet himself, is psychologized; or, what the reader experiences of him is the "poem."

We suggest that the critic's major concern is not the poetic act, but the critical act: his recognition of what he brings to the poem and his acknowledgement of what is already purely present in it. We shall return to this notion in our final chapter.

But we are impressed by Burke's discovery that a poem exists in a field of meanings (for example, the "Ancient Mariner"'s five strands), even though we should not wish to lose the discrete work in such a field. (One of the problems confronting the aging Husserl was to reconcile the pure data of experience with the Lebenswelt, or life-world--the continuous interplay of consciousness with the things it encounters). Of additional interest are two undeveloped observations. The first is that the body participates in thinking. Burke had already noted

in Counter-Statement that verse rhythm "established conditions of response in the body" (130). In The Philosophy of Literary Form, he asserts, less soundly, that a poem "embodies" symbolically the mental conflict of the poet ("do we not glimpse behind the agitated rhythm of Hopkin's verse, the conflict between the priest and the 'tyke'?"--10).[4] More surely, the body itself "is an actor...it participates in the movements of the mind, posturing correspondingly" (130). This was not a new discovery thirty years ago, but its implications for a psychophysical field, as opposed to the old psychophysical dualism, would surely help one's understanding of Ulysses, whose characters are inescapably conscious of myriad things almost simultaneously.

More important for critical theory, however, is Burke's noting a word's "overtones" of meaning (35). Of course a word almost always means suggestively, connotatively; but it also means in its relation to the other words in its immediate "cluster." It has its own "field" of other words. The relations or synapses among them may contribute as much to their meanings as their individual, concrete significations do.

III

Phenomenology's offer to critical theory might be introduced by Husserl's

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[4]This kind of theory was ridiculed in Edmund Wilson's Memoirs of Hecate County (1946). A "literary" woman says, "Whenever I hear a stutter, I know there's a psychic defect. I don't mean to be invidious, of course--all great literature grows out of defects--like Somerset Maugham's club foot. --And that's where your 'sprung rhythm' comes in--didn't Hopkins have a stutter!" (New York and Boston: L. C. Page, 1959, p. 367).

Cartesian Meditations (1929): "When the phenomenologist explores everything objective...exclusively as a 'correlate of consciousness,' he does not consider and describe it only as somehow related back to the corresponding Ego and the ego cogito of which it is the cogitatum. Rather, with his reflective regard, he penetrates the anonymous 'cogitative' life, he uncovers the definite synthetic courses of the manifold modes of consciousness and, further back, the modes of Ego-comportment, which made understandable the objective affair's simple meantness for the Ego" (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1950; trans. by Dorion Cairns, 1970, p. 47).

Whatever the critical theorist can retrieve from this unchastened prose may be recast and elaborated as follows. Phenomenology means, first, that what one is really "looking at" in perception is not what is out there at a certain distance, but what occurs, as a phenomenon, within his conscious field. This is different from psychologism, which at its simplest means that the object itself is really only a psychological experience.[5] Husserl never denied that logical operations had something to do with psychology, but he was less concerned with the actual cases of empirical science than with ideal laws governing consciousness: "Specifically, he was interested in the descriptive analysis of various types of thinking, of various forms and degrees of intuitive consciousness, and of modes of symbolic and direct representation" (Spiegelberg, 102-103). He viewed phenomenology as a radical (as opposed to empirical) "science of 'origins',"[6]

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[5]Cf. Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, Vol. I (The Hague: Nijhoff), 1960, pp. 92-95. Spiegelberg provides an impressive historical survey of the uses of the term "phenomenology," in both philosophical and extra-philosophical senses, pp. 8-19.

[6]Ideas (1913), trans. by W. R. Boyce Gibson (London: Allen and Unwin; New

by which he meant that when phenomena present themselves to consciousness, or the ego cogito, they essentially originate there as types of experience. When he tells his readers to go to the Sachen (things) or turn to the Gegenstand (object), he is referring to such "contents" of consciousness. To describe them without their blurring and distorting causes, functions and associations is phenomenology's fundamental program.

The description of pure types of conscious experience requires suspending, or "bracketing off," the familiar "natural attitude of experience and thought" from the perceived thing. (Ideas, p. 43). This "object," or cogitatum, is thus sharply evident, freed by the scrutiny of consciousness from the existent, matter-of-fact world. Its field is dismissed. Without its associations, it loses its familiarity and is "reduced" (clarified) to a sheer phenomenon. Husserl defines the "natural" world as "all varieties of cultural expression, works of the technical and of the fine arts, of the sciences also (so far as we accept them as cultural facts and not as validity-systems), aesthetic and practical values of every shape and form. . . . also realities of such kinds as state, moral custom, law, religion" (171). This world is nevertheless definitely present: "I do not then deny [it], as though I were a sophist, I do not doubt that it is there as though I were a sceptic; but I use the 'phenomenological' ἐποχή, which completely bars me from using any judgment that concerns spatio-temporal existence (Dasein)" (110-111). Epoché, then, is the mental act of transcending the pregiven world, indisputably there, through reflection on

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York: Macmillan), 1931, p. 171. Cf. also Husserl's "Philosophy as Rigorous Science," in Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, trans. by Quentin Lauer (New York: Harper and Row), 1965.

conscious activity by itself.

One can begin to understand the phenomenological method by noting how it is restricted. Again, the phenomenologist "transcends" the customary inferences of what he directly perceives. Thus an apple would not stand for health, nutrition, profit, beauty, Paris's choice, Adam's fall or any other relation; nor would it be an element in the picturesqueness of an orchard: "[the philosopher] forbids himself to ask questions which rest upon the ground of the world at hand, questions of being, questions of value, practical questions.... All natural interests are put out of play."[7] The apple phenomenon is neither an imperfect embodiment of an ideal appleness nor is it at first simply an "apple," for the phenomenologist is unconcerned with labeling the occurrence in his consciousness. In immediate sensation or in recollection of such sensation he regards the appearances--the blends of distinct color, shape, odor, taste, density or texture--but he does not automatically conclude, familiarly and empirically, as would an ordinary scientist, "ripening apple." He omits the commonsense, natural step of interpretation. However, in subsequent confrontations, at different times and from different perspectives, he notes the "pervasive traits," as opposed to particularities, or "regional specialties,"[8] of the repeated but never identical experience, and he can then describe the persistent "appleness" in his varying perceptions of the apple itself.

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[7]Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (1936, 1954), trans. by David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern U. P.), 1970, p. 152; cf. pp. 236-237.

[8]Peter Koestenbaum, "Introductory Essay" to Husserl's The Paris Lectures (1929), trans. by Koestenbaum (Nijhoff), 1964, p. xx.

The phenomenon originates only in consciousness, regardless of the object's independent existence. It becomes the "correlate of the subjectivity which gives it ontic meaning" (152). In other words, consciousness alone validates the world by categorizing the experiences of it. Thus data are never random or disordered, but patterned as perceived. For Husserl the validation has nothing to do with knowledge about the world or with considerations of whether or what it is. The phenomenologist removes himself from both commonplace assumptions and "scientific" (experiential) attitudes, from <u>any</u> "rootedness in the already existing world" (156). He proposes to discover how the world is revealed to consciousness, which requires the strict isolation of phenomena from their field of associations. The "method" of epoché involves scrutinizing an object within the conscious field, an object similar to the tiny but vivid picture in the view finder of a camera, and then channeling it into modes of recognition. Investigation of phenomena starts with the unrelated appearance within the recording instrument. A comparably rigorous disinterest is what the responsible critic ought to practice with the work he criticizes.

But the phenomenological epoché is useless as a critical approach without a minute examination of the work to be phenomenized--a point so obvious as to be ignored by the theorist. (Cf. Appendix A.) To paraphrase Husserl's "Zu den Sachen," Go to the texts! This seems particularly important with literary works, for in one sense the essential literary experience cannot be typical but unique, except perhaps with the same book and possibly not even then (certainly not in rereading). The reader now is both participant and spectator in the fictive world; he disengages himself from the real world (including his physical and physiological condition as a person in a particular chair

at a certain time and place, though seldom perhaps for more than a few minutes at a time) to adopt a new conscious life in an imagined world. His stream of experiences with this one book will be similar to Husserl's unified multiple perceptions of the same die (cf. Cartesian Meditations, pp. 39-40). Every other literary work will be a new world, unique--just as the reader will now be a "different" person--and the essence of his experiences in it will be typical only for that work. Here phenomenology's task is to explore that world and to identify the acts of consciousness which typify it. In another sense, the reader shares in the creative act, particularly in the process of characterization, and here Husserl's idealism more clearly pertains: the process by which the reader constitutes characters may always be the same, so that he himself creates in ways typical of his own conscious activity.

We are interested in both aspects of the literary experience. But, although we theorize on the latter, typical aspect, our demonstration is mainly of the former, in an exploration with phenomenological keys of a discrete work whose "story" resides in the expression of hypothetical acts of consciousness (the perceptions of its characters).

The assumption that consciousness regards a literary work as a self-contained "other world" suggests a point about philosophy that may not be as widely held. A philosophy, too, can be considered a hypothetical, or fictional, system in a degree of open or covert relationship with actuality and, again like literature, grounded on perception. Such a view eliminates the prejudicial gap between philosophy and literature("conceptual" vs. "re-created" experience), which is by no means filled in when literature merely capsulizes wisdom or when ideas are presented in fables. We do not assert that philosophy and literature are

the same thing. Their differences have to do with modes of presentation--usually expositive for philosophy; narrative and dramatic for literature. Nevertheless, they are approximate and symbiotic. Although Benedetto Croce, for example, distinguished aesthetic from conceptual knowledge, he argued that the conceptual depends on the aesthetic: "What is knowledge by concepts? It is knowledge of the relations of things, and things are intuitions" (expressed perceptions which do not differentiate between reality and non-reality).[9]

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[9]Aesthetic as Science of Expression and General Linguistic (1902), trans. by Douglas Ainslie (London: Macmillan), 1909, 1922, p. 22. Croce himself nearly suggests the closeness of philosophy and literature in a comment on syllogisms: "Syllogistic, reasoning in forma, is not the discovery of truth; it is the art of expounding, debating, disputing with oneself and others. Proceeding from concepts already formed, from facts already observed ... it re-states what has already been discovered" (43). One notes that a syllogism, then, is something like a metaphor; or a metaphor is a compressed syllogism expressed in terms of concrete things.

Croce might later have formulated a phenomenological aesthetic had he not been such a moralist. His Classical preferences prejudiced him against Romanticism and nearly every literary and artistic development since. In his article on aesthetics in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, 14th ed., Vol.I, 1937, pp. 263-272, he refers to Romantic (modern) literature as "the disease," "non-art" and "the gates of hell" (268-269). He emphasizes the "moral consciousness" as the basis of literature. But his definition of poetry (imaginative literature of all kinds) as "lyrical intuition"--that is, "not a pouring forth...not a cry or a lament [but] an objectification in which the ego sees itself on the stage, narrates

If Croce, who was not a phenomenologist, was correct in equating things and intuitions, phenomenology ought to be a particularly appropriate instrument in literary study. For fiction is the dramatization of intuited objects, the patterned confrontation of consciousness with the objects it is conscious of. Phenomenology is the validation of the noetic engagement; as a "science" of intuition, it is an art of assertion, appealing not empirically but rhetorically, not to common sense but to plausibility. Like good fiction it convinces without "proof," neither demonstrably "true" nor even necessarily consistent, but possessing, when it convinces, the power of revelation. Literature, in turn, does not so much reflect or generalize from "nature" as it discloses patterns of consciousness among percepta. If, for both, the existential (experiential) is itself the essential, found not in abstracted principles of "human nature," but in conscious engagement, what follows is that phenomenology ought to be as comfortable in one hypothetical world of conscious engagement (the imagined one) as in another (the "real" one--hypothetical as perceived).[10] We believe

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itself, and dramatizes itself"--suggests an affinity with Husserl (264, 268).

[10] In Being and Time (1927) Martin Heidegger writes, "The 'essence' of Dasein [human being] lies in its existence" (trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, New York: Harper, 1962, p. 67). Herbert Spiegelberg points out an important difference between this view and Husserl's: "For Husserl, man is an entity constituted by his consciousness; for Heidegger, consciousness...is conversely an activity of man, constituted by him" (The Phenomenological Movement, Vol. I, p. 303). Husserl's interest is thus epistemological ("How do we know about man?"); Heidegger's, ontological ("What is Being...?"). But we do not believe that the disagreement seriously affects the relationship which we think holds between phenomenology and literature.

that, if it cannot provide a completely new method of criticism, it can at least reestablish, on intellectual grounds, one already in practice.

IV

Almost from its beginnings, phenomenology sensed its common ground with literature. Herbert Spiegelberg notes that "even the Older Phenomenological Movement was aware of the unique richness and perceptiveness of great poetry and of the imaginative novel, especially of the stream-of-consciousness variety, as a foundation for general phenomenological insights" (Vol. II, p. 417).[11] Perhaps all insights are phenomenological, and the stream-of-consciousness technique cannot guarantee more of them than, say, the epical, figural and historical techniques of Homer, Dante and Fielding; when well done, however, it does seem better suited to representing simple acts of perception than any preceding narrative manner, mainly because it forces the author to stay out of the story, which not even the epistolary technique popular in the eighteenth century could or had been intended to do. (Cf. Appendix B.)

But even though both the new fiction and the new philosophy seemed to be working at something similar, neither the earlier nor the later phenomenologists

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[11]The "Older Phenomenological Movement" refers both to the Göttingen Circle (students of Husserl at the University of Göttingen, particularly in the decade before 1916, when he went to Freiburg) and the Munich Circle (students of Theodor Lipps, the psychologist-philosopher who promoted the concept of empathy, at the University of Munich during approximately the same time). In the latter group was Spiegelberg's own mentor, perhaps the most important philosopher to come from either circle, Alexander Pfänder (1870-1941).

formulated a criticism. Husserl (1859-1938) did not attend to literature until late--and briefly--in his career, when he was developing his concept of the life-world. In "The Origin of Geometry" (1936), he makes an incidental case for the objective existence of literature: "But geometrical existence is not psychic existence; it does not exist as something personal within the personal sphere of consciousness; it is the existence of what is objectively there for 'everyone'....peculiarly supertemporal and...accessible to all men.... And all forms newly produced by someone on the basis of pregiven forms immediately take on the same objectivity. This is, we note, an 'ideal' objectivity. It is proper to a whole class of spiritual products of the cultural world, to which not only all scientific constructions and the sciences themselves belong but also, for example, the constructions of fine literature." Husserl goes on to distinguish "sensible utterances [which] have spatiotemporal individuation in the world like all corporeal occurrences" from "ideal objects [which] do exist objectively in the world. ....Wherever something is asserted, one can distinguish what is thematic, that about which it is said (its meaning), from the assertion, which itself, during the asserting, is never and can never be thematic. And what is thematic here is precisely ideal objects, and quite different ones from those coming under the concept of language" (Crisis, pp. 356-357).

We recognize here the remnants of Husserl's forty-year-old attack on psychologism (after his own conversion--see Spiegelberg, Vol. I, pp. 92-95). And we note with interest the point that meaning (theme) is not the same as assertion itself, as well as the implication that the value of literature is not relative to the individual reader, whatever his training. But we are not sure from this statement what the ideality of literature consists of, even though its difference

from "sensible," "spatiotemporal" utterances seems plain enough. Unfortunately, in those of his manuscripts which have been published so far, Husserl does not refer again to literature. He does explain how, in "reciprocal linguistic understanding," what is meant by a speaker or writer can be "reactivated" by the receiver into a "corresponding activity" (360-361), but the process is questionable (cf. Burke) and, in any case, has less to do with literature than with communication. Husserl apparently had little experience with literature, although he no doubt thought much about the experience he did have, and it would be a mistake to derive a critical formula from this sort of meditation. What matters to us is that during his long career he developed three concepts directly applicable to critical interpretation: intentionality, the Lebenswelt and ek-stase. In drawing on these three, we must acknowledge the contributions of Merleau-Ponty to the idea of the life-world and of Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger to ek-stase. (Cf. Appendix C.) We shall discuss in turn these three concepts as they are illustrated by Joyce's three main characters in addition to Husserl's idea of epoché, which seems to us the proper analogy for a critical attitude and foundation for a critical method.

V

Joyce's Ulysses has been heavily "interpreted," even anagogically; highly "fabled." But to track down its various "levels" of meaning is to vitiate it while refusing, as Heidegger would say, to let it "be." What ingenious readers are really describing is not what Ulysses means in a disinterested, perceived sense, but what they choose to make of it in a kind of perverted intentionality. This is the false "literature of ideas" and will flourish as long as readers demand sermons from stones. However, there is a true literature of ideas, of

which Ulysses can be considered an example, in a Husserlian sense of "ideas," which does not mean generalizations about or attitudes toward life.

Fundamentally Husserl meant the contents, or objects, of consciousness--the things one is conscious of. These result from the intentional (morphic) operation of consciousness on sensory (hyletic) data. Husserl called this combination "formless materials and immaterial forms" (Ideas, 246-251).[12] Intentionality, or noesis, is thus the directional activity of consciousness, as implied in being conscious of something. The common name for it is perception: "whether the perceived [object] exists or not, whether the perceiving person is mistaken about this or not....it does not affect at all the fact that the subject in question does...carry out a perception...that he does in fact have the consciousness: 'This tree here,' that he thereby effects the straightforward certainty that belongs to the essence of perceiving, i.e., the certainty of straightforward existence" (Husserl, Crisis, 236-237).

A true literature of ideas is the literature of the objects of consciousness

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[12]In his last decade, as he humanized his phenomenology in the face of Europe's collapse, Husserl used Idea in the "teleological sense" of a shaping human self-understanding--the meaning of being fully human (see Crisis, especially pp. 3-18, 269-299 and 335-341). His gradual and rather dramatic involvement with history, as well as the connections between his thought and the "Reason" of Plato and Kant, is told in Paul Ricoeur's Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology, trans. by E. G. Ballard and L. E. Embree (Northwestern), 1967, pp. 143-160. This commentary is especially helpful on the Cartesian Meditations. On the hyle-morphe duality, see pp. 13-34, and also Aron Gurwitsch, The Field of Consciousness (Pittsburgh: Duquesne), 1964, pp. 265-273.

and thus relates Husserl to Joyce, who was a preeminent writer of it. Note that there is no truly psychological literature, of the actual process of thinking, although the stream-of-consciousness technique may give that impression; nor does one seem possible. Words themselves are abstractions, and the literary work is necessarily artificial. But while they cannot really "represent" the operations of consciousness, words can indicate what consciousness is of. And this artifice is at least as plausible as, in older fiction, the causality of plot.

We ought to note that we are not interested in phenomenology as a new toy--in winding it up and watching it go. It is too difficult a philosophy for tricks. We are interested in establishing its credentials for criticism, especially of narrative fiction. Criticism too is an art, but a useful art, of connections and discriminations. It has to justify its existence, to earn its own way by service to understanding if it intends to offer more than dilettantism or connoisseurship, even if it is not, as ours is not, primarily exigetical. We believe that phenomenological criticism, like phenomenology itself, can disclose, illuminate, reveal. Perhaps above all, from its position correlative to Husserl's epoché, it can provide an understanding of character as realized in the given representations of acts of consciousness.

We have concentrated on the masterpiece of modern fiction which has most received critical attention, some of it deserved. But we have made no attempt to summarize the enormous amount of Joyce scholarship or even to mention more than a few pieces which have seemed particularly applicable or challenging to our findings. We have preferred our method to be as "bare," yet as soundly phenomenological as possible. We rely heavily on Husserl and Merleau-Ponty,

somewhat less on Heidegger. But we do not confront the Hydra of reconciling their sometimes very different notions or even of unifying Husserl's own divergent thought--tasks which we gladly leave to Spiegelberg, Ricoeur and others, and which would have nothing to do with the purpose of this book. For we believe that good criticism is carefully exlectic, adapting and expanding to the structure and scope of the imaginative work it examines.

We have mentioned intentionality, "the main phenomenological theme" (Ideas, p. 241), but we begin our analysis, in Chapter 3, with what Husserl was working on toward the end of his life, the idea of the Lebenswelt, or life-world. For the life-world seemingly demonstrated by the consciousness of Joyce's hero Leopold Bloom first convinced us that a phenomenological criticism was not only possible but, at least since Henry James, necessary. Indeed, field ontology, implied by noetic activity itself, is the mode of being expressed in nearly every intellectual discipline from the late nineteenth century to the present. In the next chapter, therefore, we trace the gradual defeat of the ancient substance-accident ontology and the commensurate establishment in human consciousness of field ontology, which we then "observe" in Ulysses.

2. The Ontological Revolution

> I would fain ask those philosophers who found so much of their reasoning on the distinction of substance and accident, and imagine we have clear ideas of such, whether the idea of substance be derived from the impressions of sensation or reflection? If it be conveyed to us by our senses, I ask, which of them, and after what manner? If it be perceived by the eyes, it must be a color; if by the ears a sound; if by the palate a taste, and so of the other senses.[1]

David Hume's vehement attack on the ancient notion of substance might strike the modern reader as odd. Aristotle, who had originated the idea as a useful way of explaining the changing appearance of things (which implied a changeless substratal matter) admitted from the first that substance was in itself unknowable. His conclusion was reaffirmed by Descartes 2000 years later. In Arguments Demonstrating the Existence of God, Descartes denied that substance could be directly experienced; it was, rather, "any property, quality, or attribute of which we have a real idea."[2] Thus Hume's dismissal of it as an "unintelligible chimera" seems unfair, particularly since Hume himself viewed human nature as an essence "just as uniform and unchanging as any substance."[3] Nevertheless, Hume's vehemence typifies modern philo-

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[1]David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40), ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge (London: Oxford), 1888, pp. 15-16.

[2]Philosophical Works (Meditations, 1641), ed. by E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (New York: Dover), 1955, Vol. II, p. 53.

[3]R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (London: Oxford), 1946, p. 83.

sophy's impatience with the subtle and abstruse reasoning held to be typical of the Scholastic successors to Aristotle and intimately associated with Catholicism by the "protestant" theologians, philosophers and scientists of the Reformation and the Renaissance. They sought certainty, either self-evident or mathematical.

Protestantism did have its rational apologists, such as the Cambridge Platonists. But to the extent that it was anti-rational, dogmatic, disputatious and sectarian, it stressed a free, direct and individual access to God, incomprehensible though He might be.[4] For Martin Luther, early in the sixteenth century, reason had been merely a "whore"--his attitude anticipating such later thinking as that of Søren Kierkegaard and Jean-Paul Sartre, who would hold that the notion of God, especially of Christ, is inherently paradoxical and absurd, unable to be glossed by such doctrines as the medieval notion of subsistence, in which Christ had been explained as being at once God and man. To Sartre such a mixture would imply the impossible union of the pour-soi with the en-soi.

Hume's Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding (1748), the secular counterpart to Luther's terse metaphor, expressed the modern trust in the supposedly indubitable self-evidence of direct experience: "Does it [school metaphysics] contain any abstract reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames; for it can contain nothing but

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[4]On Protestant attempts to make faith and reason agree, see Basil Willey, The Seventeenth Century Background (New York: Columbia), 1935. A good literary example of the Protestant emphasis on immediacy is John Donne's elegy on the death of Elizabeth Drury ( ), whose soul goes straight to heaven. By contrast, the protagonist of the late-medieval morality play Everyman is followed by the Church even in his grave.

sophistry and illusion."[5] Actually the break with the old order was not all that clean in Hume's thinking; his own "fideism" implied that the hidden realities--substance by another name--could be reached by faith. Indeed, the new dispensation was perhaps even more "substantial" than the old, the difference being a new, blind ontology as opposed to an old, sophisticated epistemology. But what is important to modern philosophy is Hume's experiential spirit, suggested for example, by Husserl's famous injunction, "Zu den Sachen" (Go to the things!).

Husserl admired both Descartes and Hume, philosophers different in methodology and goals, as we shall show, but alike in idolizing mathematics, the supreme example of the relationship between elements immanent only to consciousness and capable of yielding certain knowledge; and alike also in believing that the indispensable foundation of philosophy is direct experience. In this they of course opposed Aristotle, whose notion of substance had been meant to explain phenomenal change within experience by means of extra-experiential inference. Since substance was inaccessible to direct experience, Hume had to reject it.[6]

Science--especially physics, the science concerned with natural change--

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[5]Ed. by Selby-Bigge (London: Oxford), 1902, p. 165.

[6]Hume's anti-Scholastic bias is again apparent. No Schoolman or any other earlier philosopher had ever claimed that substance <u>was</u> accessible. On other Enlightened prejudices see Lewis Mumford's <u>The Pentagon of Power</u> (New York: Harcourt), 1970, p. : "Thinkers like Voltaire and Diderot, judging medieval institutions by the decayed survivals of their own day, took it for granted that the Middle Ages were a period of besotted ignorance and superstition...assuming that no serious progress had been made in any department until their own period."

also moved from reasoning based on authority to that based on mathematics and direct experience--provided that the experience was capable of quantification. Unlike the Aristotelian mode of explaining objects as properties qualifying an unchanging substratum, and events, in non-quantitative, teleological terms, the new physics (with such aberrant exceptions as Newton's absolute space and time) described objects in terms of behavior, or process--not of what they are but of what they do. For example, Galileo's equation of motion, $S = \frac{1}{2} at^2$, contains no description whatever of the "inner nature" of objects and no teleological explanation of why they fall.

Already, then, in the physics of Galileo and his successor Newton can be detected the nucleus of an area, or field, theory of objects. Hume's attack on substance was the first clear statement of what would become the area theory of man:

> But setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind, I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of perceptions.... The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. .... The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind; nor have we the most distant notion of the place, where these scenes are represented, or of the materials, of which it is compos'd. (Human Nature, p. 252 ff.)

Directly opposed to the traditional theory of a fixed, substantial soul supporting an indefinitely large number of properties, this passage speaks for

philosophy, the sciences and the arts in enunciating a new theory of human being. It foreshadows the existentialist theory of man as being-in-the-world, with the corollary, prominent in Sartre's doctrine of the priority of existence over essence, that the individual human nature is self-constitutive. The ontological revolution does not end with Hume or even with Kant, but rather, anti-climactically, with the post-Kantian philosophers of the nineteenth and twentieth century. But with Hume it is already apparent how the story will turn out.

This chapter outlines the high lights in the profound change from substance-accident ontology to the field ontology characterizing modern thought. We begin with Aristotle.

II

Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) attempted to improve upon the one-sided ontological views of his predecessors. Thales and Anaximander had stressed the dominance of matter; Pythagoras and Plato, of form.[7] At first sight Aristotle's own theory of substance hardly seems an improvement; In the Categories, the Physics and the Metaphysics--the three works wherein he discusses the notion at length--substance has a number of meanings: essence, predication, concrete things, natural processes and so on. We shall concentrate only on the definition of substance as that which endures through change, which "is capable of admitting contrary qualities" (Categories, V, IVa, ll. 11-12).

The requirements for change are matter, form and privation.[8] First, or

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[7]We are not concerned here with the accuracy of Aristotle's interpretations, which have been attacked by Heidegger and others, but rather with the Aristotelian tradition, or "sedimentation," which is part of the Western intellectual heritage. Quotations are from The Works of Aristotle, ed. by W. D. Ross (London:Oxford), 1930 1928

[8]Privation means a substance in the state of needing a new form. Frederick Copleston, S. J., uses the example of water, heated to a certain temperature, "needing" the form of steam (A History of Philosophy, Vol. II, Mediaeval

primary, matter (pure, indeterminate potentiality) is the ultimate source of substance; from it the concrete thing comes to be without qualification and "persists in the result" (Physics, I, IX, 192a, ll. 32-34). In observable, or accidental, change the concrete subject plainly remains unaltered, as in the fashioning of a statue from a block of stone, which afterward is still stone, no matter what its new form is. By analogy, substantial change --wherein the original substantial form is succeeded by another--also requires the persistence of primary matter, which, however, cannot be directly known since it has no form. Primary matter appears only secondarily, as experienced in inumerable forms, which come and go. Thus, paradoxically, "the most real things in the world...are not fully knowable."[9]

Aristotle's ontology was not without problems. One, still unsolved, was individuation. Since human form (eidos) is identical for all people, the differences among individuals must be due to secondary matter (flesh and bone). But the cause of the differences in matter, and therefore form, remains a puzzle. What is now the main deficiency of Aristotle's hylomorphic conception is its world of fixed species whose members occupy discrete sections of space-time too static to allow for process. In the sub-microscopic world of modern physics, if Werner Heisenberg's "uncertainty principle" is to be taken seriously,

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Philosophy, Part II (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday), 1962, p. 47.

[9]W. D. Ross, Aristotle (London: Methuen), 1923, p. 170. Copleston's example of substantial change is grass which becomes cow-flesh. Prime matter, "which is common to the grass and to the flesh," is unknowable. But its form, "as grass, cow, oxygen, hydrogen, or whatever," is (pp. 45-46). The indeterminate substance underlies even the chemical breakdown of grass into its elements (substantial forms

how can one regard electrons as concrete individuals persisting through change? In the macroscopic world of human beings, on the other hand, human individuality appears to be the result not of a pre-given invariable essence but of a dialectical interplay with the environing world.

But we wish to note an interesting point: the germ of field ontology (and an implicit solution to the individuation problem) is Aristotle's own conception of essence as end or function. In De Anima he states, "It is right to call things after the ends they realize" (416b, l. 23); and, in the Metaphysics, "This is the essence (to speak abstractly) which in some cases is the end...and in some cases is the first mover" (17, 1041a, ll. 27-30). What Aristotle had arrived at was what the Scholastics came to call "intention." His idea was that the "mental act" always refers to what appears to be, whether or not it actually is.

Later, Scholastic realism claimed that in the act of knowing, an object becomes "reconstituted" in an immaterial form within the mind. This concept of intentionality was subsequently confined to Thomistic philosophy until Franz Brentano (1838-1917) used it in attempting to develop a comprehensive psychology. We mark, then, the debt to Aristotle even as we consider how his substance-accident ontology came to decay.

III

Medieval theology's main task was to explain Christ's dual nature--"unto the Jews a stumbling block, and unto the Greeks foolishness" (1 Corinthians 1:23). This effort required a rational ontological system. Elaborated as subsistence, Aristotle's idea of substance apparently could provide Christ's God-man nature with a rational foundation; furthermore, it could justify such ancillary dogmas

as the doctrine of transubstantiation. But in modifying the theory of substance to suit their needs, medieval theologians compromised it and thereby weakened it as a viable idea.

Subsistence was substance extended to the material state, just as the end of a line, though part of the line, contacts something beyond itself. As an intermediary between pure essence and existence, it helped solve the problem of how the two are brought together. Theology made great use of it. Man's rational soul was subsistent in that it was incorruptible, yet created, finite and embodied. God, on the other hand, was pure act--uncreated, infinite, purely spiritual. As immaterial beings, angels filled the gap in the chain of being between God and man; but no finite subject could bring its own essence to existence, depending rather on the subsistent linkage supplied by God.

Christ's dual nature could not be merely "accidental," which would imply two existences, a human and a divine--in effect, split personality on a supreme scale. Although He existed in two different orders, Christ was still one person. The secret lay in God's miraculous power. He could bring Himself into human existence: "the Divine Nature makes use of the human nature, as of the operation of its instrument; and in the same way the human nature shares in the operation of the Divine Nature, as an instrument shares in the operation of the principal agent."[10]

What weakened the idea of substance was the very miracle, which of course did not really explain anything. It made superfluous the theory of subsistence

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[10] Summa Theologica, trans. by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Vol. II (New York: Benziger), 1941, p. 2132.

and thereby vitiated the idea of substance from which the theory derived; for neither substance nor accident could apply to the divine hypostasis.

Still more damaging was the theological doctrine of transubstantiation, which means that in the Communion Sacrament the consecrated bread and wine are wholly converted to the body and blood of Christ. Again the ontology which provided the rational foundation was compromised. A transubstantial change is quite unlike the substantial change found in nature, where, according to Aristotle, substantial form changes but matter persists. It "is entirely supernatural and affected by God's power alone" (Aquinas, Vol. II, p. 2449). This special change "extends to the whole nature of being...so that, to wit, the whole substance of one thing [is] changed into the whole substance of another.... Hence this is not a formal, but a substantial conversion; nor is it a kind of natural movement" (2450).

Aristotle's ontonlogy could accommodate natural change but not a change of both matter and form at once. Indeed, from the Aristotelian point of view, a change in which nothing corresponds to matter--in which nothing persists--is inconceivable. A Thomist might answer that even in substantial conversion something persists; for, as St. Thomas said, "It is evident to sense that all the accidents of the bread and wine remain after the consecration" (2450), and therefore "it follows that the accidents continue in this sacrament without a subject. This can be done by Divine power: for since an effect depends more on the first cause than the second, God, Who is the first cause both of substance and accident, can by His unlimited power preserve an accident in existence when the substance is withdrawn" (2463).

That sense qualities, or accidents, can exist in a "free-floating" state,

detached from the substance in which they normally inhere like raisins in a pudding, is a striking example of how Aristotle's substance-accident ontology was distorted to rationalize a religious dogma which had to depend ultimately on faith.[11] "Free-floating" sense qualities would be much more in keeping with Bishop Berkeley's subjective idealism 500 years after Aquinas than with Aristotle's realism, for sense qualities would be "available" for perception only because of God's power. An Aristotelian realist, St. Thomas could not consistently appeal directly to this power, even though the doctrine of transubstantiation required it. At the same time his trust in a divine miracle to convert substance inverted Aristotle's philosophy of change, which had no place for miracles.

Finally the doctrine of transubstantiation simply contravened plain sense, which could understand raisins in a pudding but could not see how such a substratum could be removed without altering the qualities themselves. The new protestant spirit would reject such subtlety as absurd. Ironically, its scorn for rationalism would itself become a "fixed characteristic" in modern times, contributing to one of the most durable prejudices against the Middle Ages.

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[11]With some variation, the notion of free-floating accidents was held also by other medieval theologians, notably William of Ockham (ca. 1300-1349), who argued that, although accidents usually exist together in nature with individual matter and form, they can by divine power exist independently, as when the body and blood of Christ are preserved in the host without extension. Cf. G. Buescher, The Eucharistic Teaching of William Ockham (St. Bonaventure, N. Y.: Franciscan Institute), 1950.

IV

René Descartes (1596-1650), traditionally regarded as the first modern philosopher, would not at first seem to have broken with Aristotle, because his own metaphysics was apparently still oriented on the category of substance. Actually all that was old about his epistemology, at least at the start, was the terminology, which obscured the radical nature of his approach--but an approach, as we shall show, not carried far enough. The novelty of it may be seen in his position on transubstantiation. Antoine Arnauld had opposed the Cartesian ontology as incompatible with transubstantiation since it denied that accidents "can be comprehended apart from the substance in which they inhere and [implies] that hence they cannot exist apart from it." Descartes's reply turned on the word "species" (rather than the "accidens" used by the Council of Trent), meaning semblance, or appearance. In his interpretation, what remains of the bread and wine after consecration is merely their appearances, not "real accidents"; "the only thing by which our senses are stimulated is that superficies which forms the boundaries of the dimensions of the perceived body." This, he concluded, is no part of the existence of a body, but a limit, or boundary, with, only a derived, or "modal," reality (Philosophical Works, Vol. II, pp. 95, 117).[12] His reduction of "real accidents" to "sense

[12] Descartes noted the inconsistency in the Scholastic defense of transubstantiation: "Hence there seems to be a contradiction in believing with the Church that the whole substance of the bread is changed, and meanwhile thinking that something real remains, which previously was in the bread, for nothing real can be conceived to remain except what subsists, and though it is called an accident, we nevertheless conceive it as a substance" (Vol. II, p. 120).

qualities" was an important step in dissolving substance out of nature.[13] Replacing it with subjectivity inevitably led to the notion that an object is only as it appears to the cognizing ego.

Descartes's emphasis on perception rather than on what is perceived shows his sharp divergence from ancient and medieval philosophy. And yet his clearest definition of substance--"everything in which there resides immediately, as in a subject, or by means of which there exists anything that we perceive,

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[13] Sense qualities are "secondary qualities," which "have the power of moving our nerves in various ways" (Vol. I, p. 296) and are a standard feature of Cartesian psychophysical dualism. The idea of secondary qualities resulted from Galileo's efforts to arrive at a mathematical formulation not only of the gross behavior (primary qualities) of bodies, such as speed and acceleration, but also of such characteristics as color and odor, not usually thought to depend on changes in position, size and shape. Mathematical formulas can of course be applied to primary properties (for example, Galileo's equation of motion, $s=\frac{1}{2}at^2$), but not to such qualities as color and odor, for which only an indirect mathematization is possible, and even this depends on the assumption that sense qualities are caused by a corresponding set of shapes and motions. Galileo and his successors assumed that the dependence was "one-sided," that consciousness was merely epiphenomenal, somehow receiving its private data from outside itself. The resulting bifurcation of the world of everyday experience thus prepared for Descartes's psychophysical dualism, which preserved independent psychic being only by severing it entirely from the world of pure extension.

i.e., any property, quality, or attribute of which we have a real idea" (Vol. II, p. 53)--does not seem to differ significantly from the Aristotelian and Scholastic idea of that which remains constant through change. Where he surpassed Aristotle's "confused idea" was in the notion of a substance's extension or "essential attribute": what can be known by the "natural light of reason" (common sense) is not the substance itself but the "one principal property...which constitutes its nature and essence, and on which all others depend" (Vol. I, p. 240). For example, the substance, mind, cannot be known, but its essential attribute, thinking, can be. Substance had been fundamental to Aristotle's theory of change; Descartes viewed change as succession, and substance itself had no function beyond satisfying the belief that every noun must denote some concrete extra-linguistic entity.

Thus, Descartes's philosophy verged on a radical break with the past. But he stopped short of a complete revolution, even in his method of doubt. Suspending belief in every aspect of the world allowed for an all-encompassing subjectivism, a shift of attention from what is known to how it is known--from the order of being to the order of knowing. What mattered now was not the extra-experiential (objective) world, but the very experience <u>of</u> the world.[14] But he never

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[14]By experience, Descartes meant not only the cognitive, but experience of any kind: "By the word <u>thought</u> I understand all that of which we are conscious as operating in us. And that is why not alone understanding, willing, and imagining but also feeling are here the same thing as thought" (Vol. I, p. 22). Ironically, Descartes thought that his method of doubt could reestablish, with complete certainty, beliefs in such diverse things as God, arithmetical truths and even the existence of the world of independent objects. Actually, his predecessors had

successor, John Locke, ~~(1632-1704),~~ who conceived of the mind as enclosed in a kind of inner space, its only objects atomistic sense data which, by certain psychological "laws," are constituted as external objects. Yet, paradoxically, the combination of this psychologistic idea of perception and an ontology still based on substance led ultimately to a de-substantized world. For when a thing's perceived qualities are separated from its supposed real nature, and any notion of its substance becomes untenable, an area theory results: both human and non-human entities are constituted intentionally, or functionally.

The substitution of the "mathematically substructed world of idealities" (Husserl, Crisis, p. 48) for the one actually given in perception became the basis for modern science, particularly physics with its field theories--counterparts of the area theory of man implied in phenomenology and existentialism, and in the arts, as we shall show in Ulysses. Although a quantitative treatment of natural phenomena can be found in both the ancient world and the late Middle Ages, classical philosophy's ideal of furnishing objective knowledge ~~of the world~~ had not progressed very far, chiefly because the ancients had never developed a method for verifying an ~~attaining objective truth about manifestations of one~~ all-encompassing ~~sphere of~~ reality. The great achievement of Renaissance science, especially of Galileo's new physics, was that it hit upon such a method, in mathematizing nature. This project had long been suggested by Euclidean geometry, an abstraction from the rough-and-ready applied geometry of still more ancient peoples. In reapplying geometrical construction and measurement to the natural world, Galileo and his contemporaries thereby clothed it with a "garb of ideas" (Husserl, Crisis, p. 51). The ghost of the old substantial point of view lingered, as in Newtonian absolute space and time--presences still felt in Kant's Transcendental

Aesthetic--and in the electromagnetic ether. But for the most part, concrete, static individuals once describable as non-mathematizable final and efficient causes, were superseded by specific types of recurring events or "fields of action," reducible to formulas.

One unfortunate side effect was that Galileo and his successors mistook abstractions for what William James would call the "bloomin', buzzin' confusion" of the actual world. "Naive" is Husserl's summation of eighteenth-century rationalism (Crisis, p. 16). Much of phenomenology's effort would be to restore what Merleau-Ponty has called "the wonder of the world." Yet, Galileo's mathematization, by submerging the individual and predicting behavior, would actually help to de-substantize the world and to bring about a field ontology. This particular man, this house, this color were lost in the general because the new physics was interested not in what things are but in how they behave.

V

John Locke (1632-1704) held that extension alone cannot be the central attribute of corporeal substance since it lacks solidity, but it can be the natural consequence. His view, explicitly discussed in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,[16] is at once a common-sense and empiricist version of Decartes's rational suggestion that substance is immanent. That is, substance is a naturally complex idea: not simple ideas grouped arbitrarily, but those always found together and collectively composing what common sense would call an object--a man or a horse. Here, again, area ontology is foreshadowed. But, as with Descartes, common sense was too strong for Locke. He could not remain wholly satisfied with the

[16] Ed. by A. C. Fraser (New York: Dover), Vol. I, 1959, p. 395.

recognized the profound implications in his "subjective turn." Indeed, he turned back to the world itself in his uncritical assumption that the act of experiencing was the product of an ego, or psyche, in an ordinary psychological sense. In advancing toward the certainty of self-evidence (the experiencing ego itself is a "substance the whole essence or nature of which is to think" --Vol. I, p. 101),[15] he retreated to the position that what is thought about is also substantial. Like mind, whose essential attribute is thinking, corporeal substance also has an essential attribute--not the ultimate concreteness of Aristotle's hyle, but abstract, geometrical, bare extension. But this extension, or the content as well as the process of experience, was now indubitable: "It is at least quite certain that it seems to me that I see light, that I hear noise and that I feel heat. That cannot be false" (Vol. I, p. 153). The pressure of tradition was too strong for Descartes's independent thinking. He ~~Descartes~~ did not realize that his thought was really thrusting forward toward area theory and that within his system, built around the notion of distinct ideas, neither mental nor corporeal substance had any role except the negative one of preserving the bones of Aristotle's ontology.

How mind and body interacted, even in cognition, became an insuperable problem, which only God could solve. What resulted from Descartes's failure to establish the intentional aspect of perception is seen in the psychology of his empiricist

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long since certified God, and it had never occurred to them that the existence of the world needed establishing at all.

[15]Descartes's most explicit defense of this assumption is his reply to Hobbes's objection that he unjustifiably equated thinking with the object of thought: "It is certain that no thought can exist apart from a think that thinks; no activity, no accident can be without a substance in which to exist" (Vol. I, p. 64).

notion of immanent substance and fell back upon the supposition of an extra-experiential, transcendent substratum, in which the "qualities" of ideas inhere: "not imagining how these simple ideas can subsist by themselves, we accustom ourselves to suppose some substratum wherein they do subsist."[17] Substance was now a general idea obtained by "abstraction."

Locke's use of both "abstraction" and "idea" is ambiguous. If by abstraction he means what he earlier described as a process of separation, in which one picks out a particular idea appearing with others, he can hardly conceive of substance as substratum. More importantly, if by idea he means "whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking" (Essay, Vol. I, p. 32), and if all ideas arise from experience, as his empiricism holds, it is difficult to understand how he could ever believe in an idea outside of the mind. The perplexity increases. If the mind is "white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas" except those derived solely from experience (Vol. I, p. 122), it ought to be trapped in the circle of its own ideas. But Locke insists that by means of a certain class of ideas, those of sensation, one can proceed to knowledge of the particular thing (fire, a rose) which brings sensation about.[18]

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[17]Although he was not always consistent, Locke distinguished between ideas and qualities. An idea is "whatsoever the mind perceives in itself"; a quality is "the power in things to produce a particular idea in our minds" (Vol. I, p. 169). Locke speaks of powers apart from qualities as being the "aptness we consider in any substance to give or receive...alterations of primary qualities" (Vol. I, pp. 398-399). Powers are thus properties of things themselves, responsible for the sense data one receives from them.

[18]Husserl criticizes Locke for ignoring intentionality (Crisis, p. 85), but apparently he overlooks the implicit intentionality in Locke's account of sensitive knowledge.

In other words, ideas of sensation are themselves the means for leaving immanent experience and contacting extra-experiential objects.

Unlike Descartes or Husserl, Locke was not a philosophical protestant, demanding clear ideas and immediate self-evidence. Rather, like Alfred North Whitehead, who knew that a successful metaphysics must include what cannot be experienced, he realized that what is most obvious is not always most important, and, conversely, that the ultimate furniture of the world is usually not openly displayed. "It is plain then," he wrote in Human Understanding, "that the idea of corporeal substance in matter is as remote from our conceptions and apprehensions, as that of spiritual substance or spirit; and therefore from our not having any notion of the substance of spirit, we can no more conclude its non-existence than we can for the same reason deny the existence of body; it being as rational to affirm there is no body, because we have no distinct and clear idea of the substance of matter, as to say there is no spirit, because we have no distinct and clear idea of the substance of a spirit" (Vol. I, pp. 395-396). ~~Thus Locke and Whitehead tend to be "muddleheaded"; Descartes and Husserl, "simpleminded."~~ Yet, although Locke could never disbelieve in extra-experiential substance, his contradictory theory of natural groups of ideas, immanent in experience, which form objects in the mind, portends the ontological revolution.

VI

Like Descartes and Locke, Bishop George Berkeley (1685-1753) believed that sense data cannot be free-floating but must have nonsensational support. He could not accept, however, his predecessors' ultimate reliance on material substance, a notion tending to support atheism and scepticism.[19] Purely philosophically, their psycho-physical dualism involved an insurmountable problem: (1) ideas

Footnotes for Section VI are on p. 22

are the immediate data of experience and necessarily depend on consciousness; but (2) they are engendered by a nonexperiencable world of material bodies. How could an ego-generated world have a nonegological foundation? Furthermore, what would bring an idea into contact with objects? In Locke's own data-sensationalism no perception could be closer to external reality than any other; and, since nothing "but an idea can be like an idea" (p. 206), there would be as wide a gulf between an idea and its supposed objective source. No idea could come from material substance without volition, the source of action. Only a mind more powerful than man's could cause unwilled ideas, as Descartes had allowed while using material substance as a go-between to avoid seeming to charge God with the deception of providing an external world which only appears real.

Berkeley of course had no doubt about God's existence, which was argued by the very data of experience: "Every thing we see, hear, feel or anywise perceive by sense, being a sign or effect of the POWER of God" (Human Knowledge, p. 109). But all one could really know of God or anything else were phenomenal aspects, or perceived objects--in God's case, only signs. What exists is what is perceived. What cannot be perceived cannot be said to exist, unless some sign is offered to sense; transphenomenal entities--free, active beings capable of volition, such as God, spirit and all minds--can only be thought of but not directly perceived and known.

Although he disproved material substance, he could not satisfactorily prove spiritual substance, which nevertheless he had to rely on to explain how notions of unperceivable entities are possible. His argument for the existence of other minds proceeded on analogy: since we know that we behave in definite ways--that our bodies exhibit certain sequences of motion under given conditions--when we

observe a similar "collection of ideas" exhibiting similar motions under the same conditions, we can conclude, "there is a distinct principle of thought and motion like to ourselves, accompanying and represented by it" (p. 109). What especially interests us here is that Berkeley concluded an analogous spirit not from the collection of ideas itself but from what it may be observed doing.[20] People are people by how they behave rather than by what they "are." Berkeley was only a step away from area theory. When he referred to the mind as a "congeries of perceptions," he was on the very threshold. But he never crossed it, even though area theory was suggested in his activist theory of mind.

The source of ideas had to be extra-mental, but the mind could experience nothing unless it were actively receptive.[21] ~~His~~ Berkeley's conception of mind was not at all the Lockean "white paper," a passive receptor of impressions, but rather a "thinking, active principle that perceives, knows, wills, and operates about ideas."[22] To express the relation between a thing and its qualities, ~~Berkeley~~ he substituted a prototype of phenomenology's intentionality for the old inherence. What sensory signs of objects mean ultimately intends, or constitutes, the objects themselves. Ideas relate to intentions as letters relate to an entire word or phrase. Just as one usually pays no attention to individual letters in reading, so he usually takes no note of an object's individual sense qualities: "It comes to pass that the mind often overlooks them, so as to carry its attention immediately on to the things signified" (Alciphron, p. 156).

Language, like more direct sensory data, sets off signification. When it is abused, the mind wrongly responds with such falsehoods as "abstract ideas" (Human Knowledge, p. 27). God's language--at least the language by which He

speaks to man--is mathematics. This language is best learned "by a diligent observation of the phenomena within our view," which leads us to "certain general laws [which] run through the whole chain of natural events (pp. 88, 67); and these may be stated as mathematical hypotheses, which derive from actual observation and not from such occult entities as force, gravity or impetus (grammar bewitches readers to hypostasize such terms as "gravity," which are merely grammatical substantives). By positing an Author of nature, Berkeley ~~would~~ assisted in freeing science of such imaginary entities as phlogiston in eighteenth-century chemistry and luminiferous ether in nineteenth-century physics. He helped displace "inner nature" from things.

Footnotes, Chapter 2

Section VI

[19]An ancillary reason for Berkeley's belief in God is parallel, though opposite, to Locke's and Descartes's reason for believing in material substance. In Human Knowledge he argues that, since ideas of causation are not produced by men, "therefore some other spirit...causes them since it is repugnant that they should subsist by themselves" (The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, ed. by A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop, Vol. II (London: Nelson), 1948, 1967, p. 108.

[20]This leads to the interesting conclusion that, to be consistent, Berkeley would have to infer that the body of a chimpanzee is also accompanied by a spirit; such a case was made by the Scottish philosopher Monboddo, who favored the orangutan.

[21]"Berkeley's View of Spirit," New Studies in Berkeley's Philosophy, ed. by W. E. Steinkraus (New York: Holt, Rinehart), 1966, p. 69.

[22]Berkeley, Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonus (Works, Vol. II, p. 233). On Berkeley and intentionality, cf. H. M. Bracken, "Substance in Berkeley," New Studies, p. 89.

VII

The decisive repudiation of spiritual substance by David Hume (1711-1776) would make possible over a century after his death a new kind of narrative fiction and a new concept of man as being-in-the-world. In both cases "character" would result from on-going activity, from consciousness in continuous engagement with the world, rather than from fixed pre-existent essences. His repudiation would even influence concepts of liberty: as Sartre has insisted, only individuals "constituted" non-substantially can possibly be free.

A Treatise of Human Nature contains Hume's most explicit statement on how awareness of perceptions composes human "being":

> For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception and never can observe any thing but the perception.... If any one upon serious and unprejudic'd reflexion, thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him.... But setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind, I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions. (252)

Then follows his famous analogy, quoted in the first part of this chapter, of the mind as "a kind of theatre."

In addition to this "empirical" disproof of the existence of mind, Hume (like Berkeley against material substance) employs a semantical argument: we have no idea of substance, nor does such a definition as "something which may

exist by itself" provide an idea of it; for (given Hume's premise that anything which can be conceived apart can exist apart) substance "agrees to every thing, that can possibly be conceiv'd" (233). Supposedly substance is that in which our perceptions inhere; but "nothing appears requisite to support the existence of a perception. We have, therefore, no idea of inhesion.... What possibility then of answering that question, Whether perceptions inhere in a material or immaterial substance, when we do not so much as understand the meaning of the question?" (234).

The rejection of both spiritual and material substances leaves nothing but a total immanentism, devoid of any transcendent self, to say nothing of a deity serving as the ultimate source of sensory ideas. But in order to discuss the various operations of sense perception, Hume introduces such extra-perceptual elements as the laws of association and such mental functions as memory and imagination, which are more than the ideas and impressions to which they give rise. By omitting the mind's constitutive functions, which he cannot explain as physical behavior, as the modern behaviorists do, Hume ends up with the mere fact of various congeries of perception whose internal organization remains unaccounted for. Indeed, in the Appendix to Human Nature he confesses a kind of bankruptcy in his attempt to formulate mind:

> But having thus loosen'd all our particular perceptions, when I proceed to explain the principle of connexion, which binds them together, and makes us attribute to them a real simplicity and identity; I am sensible, that my account is very defective, and that nothing but the seeming evidence of the precedent reasonings cou'd have induc'd me to receive it. If perceptions are distinct existences, they form a whole only by being

connected together. But no connexions among distinct existences are ever discoverable by human understanding. We only feel a connexion or determination of the thought, to pass from one object to another. ....

In short there are two principles, which I cannot render consistent; nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, viz. that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences. (635-36)

But this is not as damaging a confession as it may seem. Actually Hume ~~had not~~ did not attempt~~ed~~ a complete, rigidly coherent philosophical scheme. ~~Rather~~ he ~~had~~ wanted to illuminate everyday experience, and Therefore ~~he~~ could not rely on metaphysics.[fn 23]

Hume's break with substance-accident ontology ~~freed~~ released human being from the self or the soul or any other substantial element. Although his doctrine of the mind as a "bundle of perceptions" does not do justice to the complexities of human being, it has led later philosophers, especially Kant, to attempt an explanation of the constitutive powers of mind--implied by Hume himself in his theory of personal identity as a "fiction"--without reverting to a substantial soul. Berkeley had already made an attempt, in averring that a conscious being is more than the content of his consciousness and has a "notion" of himself as an active being which is different from his knowledge of "ideas";

~~Cf.~~ 23 In this Hume resembles Sartre, who refuses to speculate about the origin of human being while illuminating what is distinctive in its experience. Cf. Being and Nothingness, trans. by Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library), 1956, p. 619 ff.

but he had of course identified mind with soul and thus never broke through to a de-reified concept of a consciousness, whose mode of being is act.

Hume's elimination of the substantial self with its set of fixed properties was thus a philosophical watershed for subsequent thought, particularly for the ~~modern~~ existentialist theory of man as being-in-the-world, whose "essence" is creative activity, and for such concepts as Sartre's "bad faith" (the ineluctable tendency to look upon oneself as having a fixed nature), which Berkeley had committed. ~~For us~~ Hume adumbrated the area theory of man, strikingly applied in stream-of-consciousness fiction to "character," which, particularly in the hands of such a master as James Joyce, is built up little by little through incidents engaging the character's consciousness and without the reader's being "told" much about ~~him.~~ it. ¶ But he offered constitution without a constitutor. His incomplete empiricism would father both an extreme positivism, content to catalogue laws for the emergence of objects from sense data, and transcendental idealisms--Kant's first, Husserl's long afterward. Yet its very inadequacy to the task of creating an orderly world of experience--a task made necessary by Hume's own attack on causation and the ground of induction--was meritorious after all, for it aroused Kant from his "dogmatic slumbers."

VIII

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) turned the current of ontological revolution back to the Continent, where Descartes had introduced subjectivism, which emphasized experience as such rather than experienced objects. The British empiricists had then "psychologized" ~~subjectivism,~~ it, but they also deepened its influence by their increasing interest in experience itself. Although Locke still believed in an extra-experiential substratum, he introduced a new notion of substance as a

collection of ideas habitually together. Berkeley accepted the latter and dropped the former, except for spirit, which Hume eliminated ~~it~~ altogether, thereby removing even the self from the transcendent. This left substance only as a collection of simple ideas--in addition to functions, such as memory and imagination, and forces, such as the laws of association. In the Critique of Pure Reason (1781), the celebrated answer to Hume, Kant tried to rescue philosophy from the impasse of an undiscoverable "principle of connexion" among perceptions. He explained how the phenomenal world of experience is constituted by "our manner of knowing objects...a priori."[fn 24]

Kant's position toward the external world actually accorded with Hume's: its objects are constructs; nothing is known of what may exist outside of experience except that, whatever this transcendental X is, it furnishes the raw material of our sensations. Like Hume, Kant altogether abandoned extra-experiential substance, but kept substance as connected ideas, elevating it to a category, or one of the necessary conditions of experience. But the baffling question of how experience is constituted he answered with his "transcendental apperception"--a "pure, original, and unchangeable consciousness" which "precedes all experience, and which makes experience itself possible" (136). This "pure 'I think'" unifies the "manifold of intuition" so that separate, fleeting perceptions of a thing become one (153). Kant needed to avoid both Hume's empirical psyche (a constitutive center of experience, itself requiring constitution as a part of experience) and Descartes's and Berkeley's identification of ego with spiritual substance (for which there is no evidence).

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[24] Critique, trans. by Norman Kemp-smith (London: Macmillan), 1934, 1963, pp. 41, 59.

He did not really surmount the dilemma because he could not locate apperception in a third world, at once unphenomenal and nonspiritual.[25] However, he finished Descartes's attack on what Husserl has called "dogmatic objectivism," routing it so thoroughly that the concept of the mind's creative perception has prevailed to this day, despite counterattacks on "constructionism" by philosophical realists. His famous "Copernican revolution" begins, "Hitherto it has been supposed that all our knowledge must conform to objects," which had meant as he noted, that nothing could be known about objects a priori. "We must therefore make trial whether we may not have more success in the tasks of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge" (Critique, p. 22). In brief the point is this: objects or events are known not because cognition penetrates to their essence and grasps them statically, but because their behavior is amenable to law, which is a product of human creativity: "reason has insight only into that which it produces after a plan of its own!" (20). Thus objects are "known" as they are constituted. Kant's scientific orientation--his concern not with what things are but with how they behave--lay toward field theory, the heart of which is the notion of a functional whole describable by a system of laws.

Since Galileo, in fact, the trend of science accords with the spirit of Kant's transcendental philosophy and its implicit field theory. In nineteenth-century physics, for example, comes James Clerk-Maxwell's theory of the electromagnetic field, followed at the turn of the century by Max Planck's quantum

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[25] Kant's ethical position, as developed in the Critique of Practical Reason and elsewhere, shows that he thought of a person's inhabiting the transphenomenal world, which, however, cannot be known by speculative reason.

theory and Albert Einstein's unified-field. Into early twentieth-century biology Jacob von Uxeküll introduces the theory of the life-field (Umwelt), supported in America by the discoveries of George Mead; this new world, that also of psychology and anthropology, is "the world as experienced by a living subject in his particular perspective" (Spiegelberg, p. 161). Einstein himself remarked that anyone who failed to grasp Kant's creative apperception could not understand his own theory of relativity.

The substantialist way of thinking did not pass gracefully. We have already mentioned such throwbacks as the phlogiston theory of combustion, the electromagnetic ether and Newton's absolute time and space, from which, paradoxically, Kant's own theory of time and space as a priori "particulars" derived. But for Kant time and space were also subjective and thus, intuited; they did not characterize a transphenomenal reality.

The aesthetic analogue of Kant's "Copernican revolution" was a kind of official freedom for the artist, who needed no longer assume, if he ever really had, that he confronts a world of fixed, self-contained substances, utterly independent of his wish and will, and to which his vision should conform. Supported by physics and mathematics, philosophy could now help the artist escape from space and time, as well as from representational forms.[26] He would no longer be

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[26] Cf. Sartre, What Is Literature?, p. 50 ff. Note, for example: "For this is quite the final goal of art: to recover this world by giving it to be seen as it is, but as if it had its source in human freedom" (57). Sartre's "aesthetic joy" is very similar to Frye's liberating "exuberance," although Sartre tends to become extremely literal (political) in his use of "freedom." For his full definition and discussion of human freedom, see Being and Nothingness, pp. 433-556.

formally constrained by a fixed, objective reality, a settled world view, a hierarchy of fixed being. But would he be constrained by the new behavioral laws?

We do not wish to insist too strongly on the direct influence of philosophy on art, for how much an artist is even aware of current ontological developments would be extremely variable, and the influence would probably come through the more spectacular discoveries in physics or psychology.[27] There is no question that such nonobjective painters as Wassily Kandinsky, Franz Marc and Paul Klee were stimulated by the work of Einstein and Freud or that Kandinsky's first entirely nonrepresentational work (1910) was, as art critic John Canaday writes, "an historical event of great consequence."[28] But Canaday also says: "It is true that Kandinsky is given credit for having produced the first entirely abstract painting in the early years of this century, but the family tree of abstract expressionism can be traced back to Delacroix, and beyond him to the traditions of which French romanticism was a continuation" (448). And André Malraux, who has a refined sense of the art work's relationship to intellectual movements, reminds one that what most interests and influences a painter --and maybe always has--is paintings.[29]

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[27] In The Mirror and the Lamp (London: Oxford), 1953, M. H. Abrams discusses the great influence of science, particularly Newton's, on the English poets of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The earlier group admired the Optiks for overcoming superstition; the Romantics, however, feared that Newton had "reduced" the rainbow to a prism. See especially Chapter XI.

[28] Mainstreams of Modern Art (New York: Simon and Schuster), 1959, p. 431.

[29] The Voices of Silence, trans. by Stuart Gilbert (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday), 1953, especially Part Three, "The Creative Process," pp. 276-466; and also Part Four, "Aftermath of the Absolute," pp. 468-642.

Nevertheless, Descartes's subjective turn had much to do with the artistic consciousness of the subsequent three hundred years. Reverberations of the ontological revolution occur in abstract painting, atonal music, stream-of-consciousness writing and other forms of expression.[30] Our task is to elucidate by means of phenomenology--one result of the ontological revolution--a literary masterwork which also originated in it..

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[30]Cf. Mario Praz, Mnemosyne: The Parallel Between Literature and the Visual Arts (Princeton, 1970), particularly the chapter, "Spatial and Temporal Interpenetration," pp. 191-216. Praz is imaginative and scholarly, but too brief. Of special interest, however, are the relationships he notes between the novels of Henry Green and abstract painting, and between the writings of Gertrude Stein and the paintings of Picasso and Gris.

5. The Ek-stase of Molly Bloom

The story of Ulysses might logically have ended on page 737 with Leopold Bloom's falling asleep: "He rests. He has travelled." The voyage is over; our hero has dutifully and bravely attended a funeral, conducted his business of soliciting ads for the Freeman, suffered sundry humiliations, befriended a despairing young teacher, and become reconciled at least for the time being, in "abnegation, equanimity," to his wife's infidelity. Molly's unique forty-five page soliloquy, after her husband has dropped into a fetal sleep, seems almost superfluous. Certainly it has no epic antecedent, since the Heroic Age woman, no matter how treasured, was always adjunctive to her warrior husband and his deeds.

And yet the narrative benefits from her confession. Although she has been an agent of Leopold's anguish, Molly in her turn has been sorely tried by his odd habits and exasperating behavior, and she needs her day in court. It is also desirable to know more about him from her point of view, not simply in his person but in his effect: what will become of him--what imprint will he leave?

Leopold's own character mosaic, as considered in the Lebenswelt chapter, continues to piece together. Two striking facts, just learned at the conclusion of the gargantuan catechism, Molly now comments on: he prefers to sleep with his head at the foot of the bed and therefore with his feet near her face ("its well he doesn't kick or he might knock out all my teeth," 771); he has not had complete sexual intercourse with her for "10 years, 5 months and 18 days," according to the precise Überbewusstsein in the preceding section--not since the death of their only son, Rudy, eleven days old, in 1894: "I suppose I oughtnt to have

buried him in that little woolly jacket I knitted crying as I was but give it to some poor child but I knew well Id never have another our first death too it was we were never the same since" (778). Other particulars about Leopold, some of which are already known, either puzzle or annoy her: "the usual kissing my bottom," his fetish of women's underwear, his obvious flirtations and--in the case of Mary, a maid who once lived-in--apparent promiscuity; his kneeling on the floor to urinate in the chamber pot, and his inability to hold down a job ("every time were just getting on right something happens or he puts his big foot in it," 772). But the newest item, and the one which most confounds her now at 2 a.m., is his unprecedented request for her to serve him breakfast in bed: "Im to be slooching around down in the kitchen to get his lordship his breadfast while hes rolled up like a mummy will I indeed did you ever see me running Id just like to see myself at it show them attention and they treat you like dirt" (778); but she so wonders at it that she finally decides to "give him one more chance Ill get up early in the morning" (780).

But the reader becomes less interested in Leopold, who rests now <u>in perpetuum</u>. Molly has the floor and needs to talk, if only to herself, to take stock of her sixteen years of marriage and to denounce its deficiencies. A neglected wife of thirty-two, worried about losing her looks and yet satisfactorily assaulted a few hours earlier by her concert manager, Hugh (Blazes) Boylan, she purges her discontent in an unpunctuated though generally syntactic torrent of recollections, judgments, and speculations. This efflux is divided into eight long paragraphs, of which five are each about seven pages long and three, from two to four pages each. With the exception of two of the shorter units, which begin with her noticing a train whistle and end with her farting, the paragraphs are linked by simple

associations: the differences between Bloom and Boylan; the firmness of her breasts and Leopold's oral delight in them; the annoying onslaught of her menstrual purgation which, sooner than expected, makes her worry whether something is wrong with her; thoughts of what to do about Boylan.

Her reflections, which occur for the most part in bed except for two pages on the chamber pot, mainly concern her coming of age on Gibraltar, her attitudes toward men and her sexual encounters with them. The thought of Gibraltar provokes happy memories of sweethearts, including Leopold himself on Howth in Ireland. Of men she is critical, at once irritated and fascinated by them, suspicious of Bloom's life away from her and inventive of punishments for him, yet obviously fond of her odd wanderer and resentful of those who make fun of him behind his back. In her consideration of sexual experience, she rejects both masturbation, which she tried once as a girl using a banana, and flagellation, which she has only read about in one of the cheap novels Leopold has procured for her. What she prefers is straightforward coupling. Poldy's attempts at cunnilingus were unsatisfactory; the idea of fellatio, however, is much more attractive, and in her imagination the figure of a "lovely little statue" is overlaid with an image of Stephen Dedalus, whom she has not seen since he was "a darling little fellow in his lord Fauntleroy suit and curly hair." She has never had a black lover but would like to try one, and she wishes she could momentarily be a man to feel what it is like. Much of her sexual relection is taken up with justifications echoing Chaucer's Wife of Bath: "what else were we given all those desires for Id like to know...if thats all the harm ever we did in this vale of tears God knows its not much doesnt everybody only they hide it I suppose thats what a woman is supposed to be there for or He wouldnt have made

us the way He did so attractive to men" (777, 780). Her own body absorbs much of her curiosity, and she admires Leopold for his knowledge of physiology; he knows "a lot of mixed up things especially about the body and the insides I often wanted to study up that myself" (743).

But with her decision to cook Leopold's breakfast comes at least a temporary resolution of frustration. The final hymn to Gibraltar releases her turbulence and renews her pleasure in first accepting him, whom she mixes up with Mulvey, her first lover when she was sixteen: "I liked him because I saw he understood or felt what a woman is and I knew I could always get round him... and I thought well as well him as another" (782-783). Her ultimate "Yes" doesn't affirm life in some broad sense, although perhaps the entire book does this, but rather her satisfaction even now in the excitement of that moment.

Edmund Wilson pointed out over forty years ago that Leopold defeats the suitors in the mind of his Penelope by reasserting his will.[1] It is true that Molly's "suitors" have apparently decamped--twenty-five of them, including two priests and the Lord Mayor of Dublin, if the confidential reckoning of the superconsciousness in the previous section can be trusted, which it can't. However, it is not really her thought of Leopold which has routed them, but her thought of Stephen--originating of course in Leopold's account of his own day. Although she has not seen Stephen for at least eleven years, she imagines him as physically attractive and culturally refined, one who could teach her Italian (somewhat late in the career of a professional singer) and also converse intelligently. Her feelings about this imaginary are at once maternal and erotic. She would like to take care of him and let him stay in the empty room upstairs; she would also

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[1] Axel's Castle (New York: Scribner's), 1930, pp. 201-202.

enjoy being the mistress of a famous young poet ("publicly too with our 2 photographs in all the papers") who would not be too young for her. Boylan by contrast is an utter boor, with "no manners nor no refinement nor no nothing in his nature slapping us behind like that on my bottom...the ignoramus that doesn't know poetry from a cabbage" (776).[2] But her implied dismissal of Boylan, like her plans to become enigmatic and haughty in order to make Poldy desire her again, remains in doubt. Were the story to continue--a notion made impossible by Molly's soliloquy, as we shall show--probably nothing would change for long. The suitors would be back.

II

The contents of Molly's consciousness are less interesting than her act of consciousness--her cogito. Molly herself is so banal--surely the most ignorant heroine in psychological fiction, including Madame Bovary--that one can almost be persuaded that her confession is wholly insipid until he notices that her experience of thinking is by no means dull. Joyce's achievement here is not so much the suggestion of a conscious stream, which is rather obvious--sentences and phrases strung together by association and worked into a tapestry by motifs--but the plausible realization of the phenomenological concept of temporality. Although Joyce apparently knew nothing of phenomenology, as we have said, nevertheless, working in the same Zeitgeist with Husserl, he

[2]Although their contents of consciousness are given differently, Molly and Leopold, like most married couples, express themselves similarly. Cf. Leopold's "For example one of those policemen sweating Irish stew into their shirts; you couldn't squeeze a line of poetry out of him" (166).

seems to have made similar discoveries about the structure and operation of consciousness. Molly, for example, experiences a convincing if imperfect ek-stase.

As Spiegelberg points out in his helpful discussion of Heidegger's Being and Time, the "ecstatic" nature of temporality should not be confused with mystic ecstasy (335-336). Nor has it anything to do with rapture. More literally, ek-stase signifies a standing beside, a reaching beyond oneself to past, present and future at once, thereby transcending "time" in the usual chronological sense. Since, according to Heidegger, being is temporal, so is human being and, therefore, human existence. Or, human existence is possible only in time. The human being--more precisely for our purposes, the human consciousness[3]--is characterized by its ability not only to confront the present but even to reach beyond it toward the onrushing future while yet grasping the past in its other hand, as it were, not so much in the sense of recalling, or searching around for it, as of simply holding it--holding, rather, facsimiles of it--in the present. Like lived-space, lived-time is an indispensable area constituted by consciousness. In Spiegelberg's words, it "does not consist of unrelated phrases, but forms a dynamic system of references in which one form implies the other" (italics added, 336).

Phenomenological temporality becomes clearer in Merleau-Ponty's elaboration of Husserl's idea of Abschattungen (shadings--retentions of the past and protentions

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[3]Merleau-Ponty dismisses any distinction between being and being conscious on the grounds that consciousness of belonging to the world has no other, transparent consciousness behind it, but his admission of the timelessness of this ultimate consciousness (without further consciousness of itself as conscious) surely brings him very close to Husserl's epoché, which he has not been able to accept (see Phenomenology of Perception, pp. 395-397, 422-424).

of the future).[4] Although Merleau-Ponty opposes Husserl's theory of epoché (consciousness ultimately conscious of being conscious) because he apparently cannot conceive of a cogito sealed off from the essences it regards like an impassive electronic eye (to him it is rather a "seeing" eye), he certainly allows for a transcendental ek-stase--"the deep-seated momentum of transcendence which is my very being, the simultaneous contact with my own being and with the world's being" (377). It is impossible, according to Merleau-Ponty, to completely disengage the constituting cogito from its constituents. If one concedes that the cogito only exists in a kind of reciprocal attraction with its cogitata (like an electromagnetic field), he can conclude that it is necessarily and entirely temporal and that time-consciousness is of neither an eroding process nor a metronomical series of events, but rather of the noesis-noema engagement itself. Certainly time exists empirically as an object measurable in microseconds, hours, eons. Both "objectively" and "psychologically" it is a necessary complement to space, which always "takes time" to cross, as implied by such measurements as light-years and parsecs. But consciousness ecstatically repudiates time's relentless motion only to discover that it has gathered the whole of time to its bosom: try as one might, he cannot abandon December 31 with a New Year's resolution on January 1. "All art is a revolt against man's fate," writes André Malraux in The Voices of Silence (p. 639), and

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[4]Husserl's indispensable study of time is The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, trans. by J. S. Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), 1964. Especially valuable is Part I, Section Two, "The Analysis of Time-Consciousness," pp. 40-97.

yet that art transfixes only too clearly man's fate.

Whether the moment of "now" is constituted as having a certain extension--"a comet's tail," to Husserl--it certainly is not constituted as one in a row of brand-new moments passing in 1-2-3 succession. It is rather a field of "future-which-lapses-into-the-past-by-coming-into-the-present" (Merleau-Ponty, p. 420, quoting Heidegger); time leafs out as "a network of intentionalities" (417). To describe time-consciousness metaphorically and yet truly is obviously impossible since putting it another way loses the sense of its instantaneous field. Even Husserl's diagram of time, adapted from Internal Time-Consciousness by Merleau-Ponty, must (because it is a diagram) lay time out in a series of moments with only the suggestion of its abiding presence: the past, "a future which has occurred"; the future, "a past to come" (423). But Husserl's scheme does help one's understanding of how at any present moment consciousness retains past moments which appear now as shadings of what they once "were": "these retentions...are continuous retentions of the continuously preceding ones" (108).[5] The same intentional activity also "leans" forward, perhaps with less surety, as protentions, or expectations, of the future. Merleau-Ponty describes such Abschattungen as potentialities: "I do not form a mental picture of my day, it weighs upon me with all its weight, it is still there, and though I may not recall any detail of it, I have the impending power to do so, I still "have it in hand." In the same way I do not think of the evening to come and its consequences, and yet it 'is there,' like the back of a house of which I can see only the facade, or like the background beneath a figure. .... Ahead of what I can see and perceive, there is, it is true, nothing more

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[5]For our purposes we do not distinguish between retention (primary remembrance) and recollection (secondary remembrance). Again, see Husserl, p. 57 ff.

actually visible, but my world is carried forward by lines of intentionality which trace out in advance at least the style of what is to come..." (416). Lived-time is the master architect of one's whole life-world.

Ulysses contains numerous examples of both protention and retention: the former, for instance, in Leopold's expectation of Molly's adultery and in Alf Bergan's incredulousness over Paddy Dignam's death; the latter in Leopold's many memories, particularly of his father--indeed, the very presence of his father--and in Stephen's continual burden of his mother's death. Molly's act of consciousness, her cogito, is revealed as the field of "now" in its ecstatic transcendence of her uneasy life. For the most part she retains more than she protends, which is fitting since her meaningful life--or the life from which she extracts meaning--is behind her:

> I dont like being alone in this big barracks of a place at night I suppose Ill have to put up with it I never brought a bit of salt in even when we moved in the confusion musical academy he was going to make on the first floor drawingroom with a brassplate or Blooms private hotel he suggested go and ruin himself altogether the way his father did down in Ennis like all the things he told father he was going to do and me but I saw through him telling me all the lovely places we could go for the honeymoon Venice by moonlight with the gondolas and the lake of Como he had a picture cut out of some paper of and mandolines and lanterns O how nice I said whatever I liked he was going to do immediately if not sooner will you be my man will you carry my can he ought to get a leather medal with a putty rim for all the plans he invents then leaving us here all day you never know what

> old beggar at the door for a crust with his long story might be a tramp and put his foot in the way to prevent me shutting it like that picture of that hardened criminal he was called in Lloyds Weekly News 20 years in jail then he comes out and murders an old woman for her money.... (765)

Certainly Merleau-Ponty's pronouncement, "I belong to my past" (422), is true of Molly. On the other hand, although her fear of a tramp's getting into the house is something like a protention, it is more an imagined possibility than an expectation. In the following example, which balances a future with her past, the possibility of Bloom's making a fool of himself and the probability of her preparing his breakfast are more truly protentive:

> I hope hes not going to get in with those medicals leading him astray to imagine hes young again coming in at 4 in the morning it must be if not more /actually it is 2, as Molly discovers when she hears the clock chime/ still he had the manners not to wake me what do they find to gabber about all night squandering money and getting drunker and drunker couldnt they drink water then he starts giving us his orders for eggs and tea Findon haddy and hot buttered toast I suppose well have him sitting up like the king of the country pumping the wrong end of the spoon up and down in his egg wherever he learned that from and I love to hear him falling up the stairs of a morning with the cups rattling on the tray.... (764)

Unfortunately, language, which "takes time" to read, cannot capture the immediacy, or instancy, of the "now" overlaid with transparencies of past and future like a photomontage. The old Edison kinetoscope more closely approximated the

retention-protention temporal field, and the cinema can suggest it, too, as in such an absorbing film as Resnais's Last Year at Marienbad, although even here the switching from moment to moment, no matter how sudden, is sequential. Words can never be as eidetic as pictures, and yet the reader's imagination can almost restore word to image so that past and present at least come close to gathering in the present. Perhaps no other art is so "incomplete" as literature, which requires a recreative reader to fulfill its promise within his own constituting consciousness. Character, that staple of narrative fiction, needs a reader to fill out what the author has at best adumbrated; indeed, the more a character is "described" the more he tends to recede from realization, especially when the description is "grand," as with James Fenimore Cooper's "airy females": "The girl raised her eyes, in that peculiar manner which is so often practiced by her sex when they commence their glances, by examining the earth at their feet, and terminate them by noting everything within the power of human vision; but she rather manifested the quality of impatience than any feeling of alarm"--The Prairie (New York: Holt, Rinehart), 1966 (1827), p. 23. On the other hand, the reader's constituting consciousness never waits docilely for an entire character-mosaic to coalesce, in the case of Ulysses, before realizing it. From the famous introduction, "Mr Leopold Bloom ate with relish the inner organs of beasts and fowls," one's constitution of Leopold easily outstrips the slowly emitted particles of information and "protends" his "shape" long before it is fully given, continually modifying the protentions in the subsequent "now"'s of disclosure.

Assuming that an imaginative reader performs a kind of transductive process with words, whose power to express is restricted by their innate "ability" to communicate, one can allow at least for an imperfect realization of ek-stase.

But note what happens: if future and past are, even in pretense, gathered together in the present moment, the effect is that of "fixing," or stopping, time so that in the illusion of preventing the future from becoming the past one is denied the anticipation of that future. This stasis, even more than simple reflection on the past, accounts for the absence of an on-going sense in Ulysses. Molly's soliloquy "freezes" the story, as the procession on Keats's urn is frozen. Leopold sleeps forever; there is no sense that June 17 will be completed: one cannot project the lived experience of the characters, as he can with most narrative fiction, beyond the present--or past perfect. Molly seals the moment in continuance, closing even the implication of continuation.

III

Something remains to be said of Molly's sexuality, which was largely responsible for the book's suppression--in the United States alone from 1922 to 1933. It should not be assumed that Joyce felt obliged to provide his readers with the "lowdown" of what healthy women think about but of course never dare to openly discuss; had he meant to do that, he certainly overestimated the patience of his audience. More important, it should not be too casually concluded that Molly is a liberated pioneer, a spokesman for repressed feminism, an Everywoman or Allwomen. She is far too narrow, superstitious, uninformed. Her most daring sexual thoughts reveal more curiosity than experience. Nor is she a sort of earth mother: fecundity is her curse rather than her blessing; she wants to copulate but does not at all want to bear children.[6] She is simply Molly, and to see her as a spokesman or a

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[6] An unpublished Master's thesis by Joanne McCarthy, Irish Molly (University of Puget Sound, 1969), one of the most judicious studies of Molly, suggests that her greatest fear is another pregnancy.

symbol is to exaggerate her own capabilities and to underestimate women in general.

But all this is not to say either that her sexual obsession is not in some way typical or normal. We discover an explanation in Merleau-Ponty's "The Body in Its Sexual Being" (Phenomenology of Perception), where he asserts that sexual life is intentional, not autonomous: "It has internal links with the whole active and cognitive being, these three sectors of behaviour displaying one typical structure, and standing in a relationship to each other of reciprocal expression" (157). In Merleau-Ponty's terms, Molly's sexuality would be her most important manner of "being towards the world," of establishing a relationship with it and expressing her existence in it. Her singing is another major expression, but not apparently a wholly satisfactory one. Dublin always has room for another singer, but perhaps can support only one such lover: "this damned old bed too jingling like the dickens I suppose they could hear us away over the other side of the park" (769).

It is important to note that her sexuality is not the object of consciousness, but rather, in Merleau-Ponty's words, "an ambiguous atmosphere...co-extensive with life" (169). So interfused is sexuality with existence that determining the proportion of sexual to other ways of being is impossible. Because Molly's thoughts are studded with sexual referents does not mean that she is a nymphomaniac or that all women "think about sex" most of the time. The "being toward the world" of sexuality simply infuses the contents of consciousness. Even so behavioristic an explanation as that she is frustrated in her marriage should be avoided not only because it is at best simplistic but also because her way of being has been sexual from childhood.

If it is true, as Merleau-Ponty says, that "ambiguity is the essence of human existence," that "everything we live or think has always several meanings" (169), then even the most explicit sexuality has a more general significance, as do intelligence and motility. Molly's sexuality signifies the field in which she is engaged with the world. Her being, which did not pre-exist, takes shape in and with the world almost pointillistically, and one recognizes her not as Everywoman but as Molly Bloom.

6. A Sketch for Principles of the Critical Epoché

The poles of subject (the reader's affective state) and object (the literary work's independent existence) are united in the reader's experience. Phenomenology, the philosophy of experience, suggests how the unity is obtained. It also shows how a fictional system may be explored philosophically. But the application of the phenomenological epoché as a critical method requires further discussion.

Insofar as phenomenology is applicable to criticism, no reconciliation between field theory and epoché seems necessary. The practice of epoché is simply directed toward the most purely discrete experiences within the whole field of experiences established by critical engagement with the literary work. The critic attempts to describe and evaluate this essential set by abstaining from his customary assumptions, values and attitudes. In other words, he puts aside his own life-world except for that part occupied by the fictional world. But should he not retain some small area of extra awareness? Might not his consciousness become so transparent outside his natural standpoint that it cannot participate in the world of the text, cannot "respond"? Husserl pushed epoché to a transcendental reduction, extending the series of bracketings so far as to be conscious only of consciousness. Obviously the critic could not function in so rarefied a position. If experience <u>originates</u> in consciousness, however, then for an experience to occur at all, there must be some natural residuum left--some texture, or "color," of feeling and attitude. But this would come from the very engagement of intentional consciousness with the world of the literary work. Thus as long as a story or poem occurs in consciousness, there is no

risk of sheer transparency.

The critic at work is both involved and analytical, though not at identical moments. If he is engaged in and therefore stimulated by the fictional world, how can he also maintain a position of detachment, from which to determine how the artist has managed the effects? This requires simply one bracketing less, one step back from the fiction, so that he can regard his just-concluded involvement; then he steps forward into it again, then back, and so on in rapid oscillation. We note that the return to detachment involves no effort of will, which is no longer available, it too *in abstinentia*, but simply follows the tug of the natural standpoint, which requires (and supplies) effort to be bracketed.

II

The problem of meaning would appear formidable. After all, how can the literary *object* mean? The difficulty is removed by dropping the term meaning and substituting Husserl's "meantness." In itself the literary work "means" nothing; rather it is *meant by* the critic's intentional consciousness, which is properly confined within the new world's outlines. A multitude of experiences may be released in the engagement of consciousness with a story, particularly with *Ulysses*, but only those are valid which have been constituted within the umbrella of the work's own world. Meantness resides in consciousness, but consciousness exists only as engaged. Therefore, meantness occurs in the engagement with words.

Exactly how words come into meantness is a question which may seem to require a large answer, but perhaps can be satisfied with a small, inexact one. We begin with the paradox that words tend less to liberate than to confine.

Joyce knew this, as Richard Ellmann has recorded: "He sometimes used Ulysses to demonstrate that even English, that best of languages, was inadequate. 'Aren't there enough words for you in English?' they asked him. 'Yes... there are enough, but they aren't the right ones.... For example...the word battlefield. A battlefield is a field where a battle is raging. When the battle is over and the field is covered with blood, it is no longer a battlefield, but a bloodfield.... I'd like a language which is above all languages, a language to which all will do service. I cannot express myself in English without enclosing myself in a tradition'" (James Joyce, New York: Oxford, 1959, p. 410).

In several ways Joyce's example is faulty: it takes no account of the phenomenon of retention, whereby the battle would be "retained" in the field after it were over, perhaps for many years; furthermore, a battle within a field probably doesn't "rage"; and perhaps no expression is possible without a tradition, not even that of calling for help. But his main point is tenable: that language is an imperfect means of expression, tending to distort and reduce experience to habitual formulas of "saying" something. Words are not a medium, like watercolors or stone, but a medium-once-removed, which conditions thinking and channels it into customary routes of communication. Their innately communicative duties limit their availability for expressing pure experience. Nor can they enable it to be purely perceived.

Fortunately, Joyce could stretch diction and style to an approximation of the conscious range. In Ulysses, the Oxen of the Sun episode, for example, concentrates English literary history in present moments of narrative, providing a nearly perfect example of ek-stase. His gift was rare, however. Not

even Sartre--himself an accomplished novelist and playwright, as well as philosopher and critic--could explain his conception of "the look of the Other" (Being and Nothingness, pp. 257-271) with anything like the clarity of Joyce's evocative presentation of Leopold and Gerty's mutually intentional awareness. Yet here again it is the reader's own intentional consciousness which makes the unmalleable words incandesce to an acceptable meantness. For the experience originally embodied in the work is also sealed up in it, incommunicable, and never reconstituted.[1] Literature is the oblique, metaphorical art. It proceeds by indirection, never yielding a pure experience, but offering one "like." Consciousness must apprehend meantness just behind or between words.

Husserl was aware of the problem of the inadequacy of language for retrieving experience. In "The Origin of Geometry" he wrote: "It is easy to see that even in [ordinary] human life, and first of all in every individual life from childhood up to maturity, the originally intuitive life which creates its originally self-evident structures through activities on the basis of sense-experience very quickly and in increasing measure falls victim to the seduction of language. Greater and greater segments of this life lapse into a kind of talking and reading that is dominated purely by association; and often enough, in respect to the validities arrived at in this way,

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[1]Cf. Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism, p. 27. An opposite notion is held by Croce in Aesthetic: no intuition is possible unless it is expressed; the reader uncovers the author's ideal intuition-expressions, evaluating the work by how adequately it lives up to these.

it is disappointed by subsequent experience" (Crisis, p. 362).[2] Sartre, explicitly concerned with the reader's experience, put the matter directly in What Is Literature?: "from the very beginning, the meaning is no longer contained in the words, since it is [the reader], on the contrary, who allows the signification of each of them to be understood; and the literary object, though realized through language, is never given in language. On the contrary, it is by nature a silence and an opponent of the word." By "directed creation," the reader must be made to use silences to invent "the quality of the marvelous in The Wanderer..., the grandiosity [Sartre's word is babylonisme] of Armance, the degree of realism and truth of Kafka's mythology...never given" (trans. by Bernard Frechtman, New York: Philosophical Library, 1949, pp. 43-45). In this view, the best that an imaginative writer can do is to direct the reader's own intentional (creative) consciousness. The writer says, in effect, "Imagine this. Now imagine that." The reader himself makes up the wonder in the lapses of language.

III

The problem of evaluating the literary work appears especially troublesome to the phenomenological critic, for judgment is necessarily an activity of the natural standpoint, where in fact it is inescapable. Just as "we are condemned to meaning," according to Merleau-Ponty, so are we condemned to judgment. But epoché implies abstention from all aspects of "spatio-temporal existence." The phenomenological critic must leave his preconceptions and

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[2] Spiegelberg perhaps had this idea in mind when he wrote, "phenomenological analysis is not primarily concerned with linguistic expressions" (Vol. II, p. 669).

prejudices at the door, and enter the literary work disarmed. Can judgment come from the suspension of judgment, ex nihilo?

Empty-minded, the phenomenological reader begins to find his way about the literary work, his sense of judgment--the critical sense--in abeyance. His intentional consciousness confronts wonder and converts it into meantness. And, again, as with his recession to an analytical position, the tug of the natural standpoint repeatedly pulls him back to the point of detachment--between the literary world, on the one hand, and the natural world, on the other --where judgment, a corollary of meantness, is possible. Happily his retention of the pure experience will linger long enough for him to judge without yielding to the temptation of putting all of his armor back on. His position now is like St. Peter's in the splendor of Christ's transfiguration: "Lord, it is good for us to be here."

But if judging requires preconceiving, what attitudes may the phenomenological critic safely resume to evaluate fairly? We agree with Austin Warren in his chapter, "Evaluation" (Theory of Literature), that "inclusiveness" is a reasonable standard--the variety and integration of experiences in the literary world, the complexity of the entire structure. But we would stress the accompanying liberation from the natural standpoint. Frye has called this value the "buoyancy" of being released from "compulsions"; Sartre, "Freedom" (from which he makes a case for political freedom); and Joyce himself, "joy." The literary work seems to provide for the realization of what the natural standpoint persistently withholds. What the reader, through the effort of putting his normal world behind him, releases himself into is the life which is only accessible imaginatively. He can become whole, "entelech-

tual," fulfilled now under the umbrella of conscious possibilities. Freedom is not easily attained, as the student of Ulysses knows. The superior work offers no ready escape, but makes good its promise to one who diligently dismisses the natural world; it permits a more complete transcendence.

see Hamm's summary (The Critical Matrix)

Appendix A

The only distinguished phenomenologist to undertake a literary aesthetic was the late Roman Ingarden, formerly a student of Husserl's at Göttingen and Freiburg. His formidable analysis of the literary work of art, Das literarische Kunstwerk (1931), dealt primarily with narrative art because Ingarden said that he feared making errors in translating the poetry of foreign languages. He divided the literary work into four strata, or Schichten. These comprise sound formation (Lautgebilde), units of meaning (Bedeutungseinheiten), the "objectivities" exhibited by meanings (dargestellten Gegenständlichkeiten) and schematized views (schematisierten Ansichten--that is, an object in fiction exists as an independent act of consciousness, but, nevertheless, also "exists" as seen, dependent on the reader's perception). Ingarden was thus concerned with the mode of being of literature, with what it is in essence, determined by its form, or the layers of its vertical structure (Aufbau). Among the problems which interested him was how words mean: how their meanings combine in sentences to form new meanings; how meaning itself means--not as a changeable existent or an ideal subsistent, but as a unique entity, seemingly independent of a reader's consciousness though actually dependent on it. He was somewhat less interested in the significance and values of literature--the concretization of its metaphysischen Qualitäten and Wertqualitäten.

A thorough, judicious review of Ingarden's book, by P. Leon in Mind, XLI (1932), pp. 97-106, defines the central problem as "the mode of being of a purely intentional entity...brought before us whenever we read or hear a word or a sentence or sentences" (97). But is this problem literary enough? Or is

it primarily communicative:

In Die Logik der Dichtung (Stuttgart: Klett, 1957, rev. 1968), pp. 24-28, Käte Hamburger objected to Ingarden's distinction between "reality-statements" and "quasi-adjudicative assertive propositions," or "quasi-judgments," to account for the seeming reality of the "simulated" world of fiction. She said that this distinction between literary and non-literary language is invalid, that it fails to explain the illusion of reality and comes from circular reasoning: the assertions in a novel are quasi-statements because they are in a novel. Ingarden replied at length and with some scorn in a new section written for the 2nd edition of his book (1960, pp. 184-192). To her charge of tautology he replied: "if we know in advance that we have to do with a creative work, we also know... that we have to do with nothing but quasi-judgments" (189). In other words, one is alerted by titles and subtitles to the fact that the statements he is about to read are not historically true. But Ingarden added that this is not the only way to tell the difference. Mme. Hamburger stood her ground, however, and, in a long footnote in the revised edition of her book, said that she remainded unconvinced that "fictivity" is grounded on "quasi-judgments," and that Ingarden had left out the most important fictive criterion, the characters.

Ingarden's interest was so much in the general case--true also of other aestheticians--that the phenomenon under scrutiny was less literature than an abstracted linguistics. Except for scanty references to Homer and Dante, to Hamlet and, more frequently, The Magic Mountain, he had little to say about specific works of literature. The result is that, for all his meticulous thinking, he seems to have built in a void.

Appendix C

Of all the major phenomenologists, with the exception of Ingarden, Martin Heidegger (1889-) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1907-1961) have taken the greatest interest in literature. Heidegger, star pupil of Husserl's in the early 1920's, has studied and even written poetry, as Spiegelberg has noted (274-275, 311-314); but those of his essays on poetry which have been available to us suggest little of his own version of phenomenology except for their intense concentration on the literary object itself. Indeed, Heidegger's criticism, as in "Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry," seems influenced by the German idealists of the early nineteenth century. He writes, "poetry is the establishing of being by means of the word."[1] But so is the shriek in the wilderness or the scrawl on the subway wall. When Heidegger is idealistically Romantic, he reminds one of Emerson, but he is dialectical and logical where Emerson is aphoristic. He explicates with care, as in his essay "Remembrance of the Poet" (on Hölderlin's "Homecoming"), but his interpretation does not consider the artifice of poetry--<u>how</u> it means.

Merleau-Ponty, as sensitive a critic as he was a philosopher, was nevertheless susceptible to viewing literature as a kind of sub-philosophy. His essay, "Metaphysics and the Novel," opens with a statement which immediately

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[1]The two essays referred to, translated by Douglas Scott, are found in <u>Existence and Being</u> (Chicago: Regnery), 1949, which also includes "What Is Metaphysics?" and "On the Essence of Truth." The quotation (p. 304) should be compared with another, from <u>Being and Time</u>, p. 205: "In 'poetical' discourse, the communication of the existential possibilities of one's state-of-mind can become an aim in itself, and this amounts to a disclosing of existence."

puts one on guard: "The work of a great novelist always rests on two or three philosophical ideas." His examples perhaps fit his generalization: "For Stendhal, these are the notions of the Ego and Liberty; for Balzac, the mystery of history as the appearance of a meaning in chance events; for Proust, the way the past is involved in the present and the presence of times gone by." Yet he is referring to implicit themes, not merely to what Husserl would call "assertions": "The function of the novelist is not to state these ideas thematically but to make them exist for us in the way that things exist. Stendhal's role is not to hold forth on subjectivity; it is enough that he make it present."[2] Good fiction thus acts out its themes or puts them metaphorically.

But Merleau-Ponty adds that these three great novelists each failed his special philosophical interest; for example, "Balzac compromises his views on the expressive relations of body and soul, economics and civilization, by couching them in the language of spiritualism." At this point Merleau-Ponty wrongly expects literary expression to have the consistency of a philosophical statement and naturally finds literature defective as philosophy. The two disciplines remained apart, he says, until the late nineteenth century, when the poet Charles Péguy and others abandoned "moral" (predetermined, superficial) categories for a new "metaphysics," which, making no attempt to explain the world, formulated "an experience of the world, a contact...which precedes all thought about the world" (28). Here he arrives at the place we have mentioned--fiction's new program of perception, as opposed

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[2] Sense and Non-Sense (1948), trans. by H. L. and P. A. Dreyfus (Evanston: Northwestern), 1964, p. 26 ff.

to action and the thought derived from it.

The new metaphysics of direct contact obviated the older moralistic manner, with its interposing author-narrator; and the realism of the new fiction would no longer depend on the amount of "personal" information about its characters or on a fictional experience's likeness to an "original," but on an author's letting his story alone, on his refraining--as Flaubert refrains in Madame Bovary--from openly judging his characters. Thus Henry James, for all his ruminations and despite his personal conviction that the novel should be a moral influence, was a realist. And Joyce was pre-eminently one, as Sartre has noted in his tough-minded essay, What Is Literature?: "in giving up the fiction of the omniscient narrator, we have assumed the obligation of suppressing the intermediaries between the reader and the subjectivities--the viewpoints of our characters. It is a matter of having him enter into their minds as into a windmill. He must even coincide successively with each one of them. We have learned from Joyce to look for a second kind of realism, the raw realism of subjectivity without mediation or distance" (228n. Sartre himself mastered the "raw realism of subjectivity" in his novel Nausea, 1938). The Naturalists, on the other hand, only pretended to be realists. The presumably "scientific" detachment of Zola, Norris, Dreiser as they confronted determinism in the shapes of heredity or environment, biological drives, "chemic" forces, or sheer chance masks a quivering neo-Gothic horror. In their zealous descriptions of the ordinary, their sensational situations and, above all, variations on the theme of victimization, the didactic tradition flourished; and it has persisted since then in various kinds of protest fiction.

Yet all imaginative literature, to the extent that it is imaginative (that it permits constitutive involvement), is metaphysical, transcending "this" world for the hypothetical, "other" world of fiction; and the latter world, as Frye has shown, may have any relationship with actuality--implicit, as in myth, or explicit (about the world), as in the novel of social reform. Merleau-Ponty's use of the term "metaphysics" seems to refer not only to a fictional realization but more precisely to a philosophical dialogue extracted from the fiction. He devotes the last twelve pages of the fifteen-page essay, "Metaphysics and the Novel," to an "amoral" interpretation of Simone de Beauvoir's L'Invitée in terms of the Other and the Ego in a triangular love-jealousy relationship. His commentary is both deft and generous. But is there no other way of talking about a literary work than "in terms of" something else? When one discusses literature "in other words," as teachers and reviewers do, he no longer is quite talking about literature but rather about a sedimentation from it or about something that it reminds him of. Merleau-Ponty has constructed a psychological paradigm, and if L'Invitée really does make "ideas exist in the way that things exist"--if, indeed, any literary work can do that--does his paradigm continue the existence of these ideas or bring into being new ones? Yet he may be right. Perhaps criticism, if it is going to communicate at all, which it must, will always have to build a sort of tinker-toy model of the real thing, the way astronomers do to show how our solar system works.